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Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws:

Landscapes and Minefields
Marc I. Steinberg and Chris Claassen

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the United States Supreme Court has limited liability for

attorneys under the federal securities acts. Prior to restrictive Supreme Court
decisions in the 1980s and 1990s,1 attorneys regularly were sued as aiders and
abettors under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule
1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder 3 and as sellers under section 12 of the Securities
Act of 1933. 4 Supreme Court decisions limiting the scope of these sections
1. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994) (holding no attorney liability for aiding and abetting in private Exchange Act § 10(b) actions);
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (construing the term "prospectus" in Securities Act §
12(2) to be limited to public offerings); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (limiting the definition of
the term "seller" under Securities Act § 12).
2. 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2005); see, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988),
vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 1104 (1989). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities based swap
agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2005); see, e.g., Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980). Section 12(a)
provides:
(a) Any person who-(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 3,
other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails,
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have effectively precluded both avenues for attorney liability in private
actions. 5 For example, in Pinter v. Dahl,6 the Court held that, for purposes of
section 12(a)(1), apart from the vendor of the security and its agent, a "seller"
is one "who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a
7
desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner."
This definition, which does not encompass attorneys rendering customary legal
services, 8 has been adopted as well in the section 12(a)(2) context. 9
Additionally, as a result of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver,'0 attorneys no longer face secondary liability as "aiders and abettors"

in section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 private actions." However, depending on the
nature and extent of services performed, attorneys may face primary liability
exposure under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.' 2
Moreover, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)
restricts the reach of state law.' 3 SLUSA preempts, with certain exceptions,
14
recourse in state law for class actions involving nationally-traded securities.
by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of
a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the
purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable subject to subsection (b), to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
5. See cases cited supra note 1.
6. Pinter,486 U.S. at 622.
7. Id.at 651. The Supreme Court rejected the more expansive substantial factor test, in part,
because "it might expose securities professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, whose involvement
is only the performance of their professional services, to § 12(1) [now § 12(a)(1)] strict liability for
rescission. The buyer does not, in any meaningful sense, 'purchas[e] the security from' such a person."
8. See, e.g., Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989).
9. See, e.g., Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
10. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
11. Id. at 173-80; see also Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (1 th Cir. 2001).
12. See Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 191. The Supreme Court in CentralBank stated:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the
securities market are always free from liability under the Securities Acts. Any person or
entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes
a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may
be liable as a primary violator under lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary
liability under Rule IOb-5 are met.
Id.; see also Rubin v. Shottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998); Trust Co. of La. v.
N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 1997); Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir.
1994).
13. See authorities cited infra note 18.
14. Id.; see also MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 8.08 (3d ed. 2001):
Certain important exceptions [to the preemption of class actions involving nationally traded
securities] exist, . . . thereby preserving state securities and common law in those situations.
For example, derivative actions may be pursued under state law. State law also may be
invoked in suits challenging the conduct of a subject issuer, any of its affiliates, or affected
corporate fiduciaries with respect to specified actions-namely, going-private transactions,

Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws
The potential effect of SLUSA is that, outside of the derivative suit and merger
and acquisition settings, 15 complainants in class actions cannot invoke state
securities and common law remedies.1 6 Hence, the parameters of federal laws
normally confine attorney1 7 liability exposure in class actions involving
nationally-traded securities.
Nevertheless, unless preempted by SLUSA, 18 plaintiffs frequently prefer
the state court forum. 19 While attorney liability under the federal securities
20
laws has received close attention in both the courts and legal literature,
attorneys' exposure under the state securities laws remains relatively
uncertain. 2 1 Consequently, the limited but significant risks that attorneys face
when complainants seek to invoke the state securities22 laws warrant an
examination of counsel's liability under these state regimes.
This article surveys and analyzes attorney liability under state securities
law. After presenting a succinct overview of applicable state law in Part II, the
article then provides a more in-depth analysis of attorney liability exposure
under these state statutes in Part IIl. The article concludes in Part IV with
separate treatment of two frequently invoked state statutes-those of California
and Texas.
II.

OVERVIEW OF ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER STATE SECURITIES LAW

Perhaps surprisingly, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (USA) as
interpreted creates a "liability gap" whereby attorneys may not be held liable in
tender offers, mergers, and the exercise of appraisal rights. Importantly, the Uniform
Standards Act declines to preempt in any way the authority of the state securities
commissions, thereby empowering the states to continue their investigatory and enforcement
functions.
Id. at 243.
15. See sources cited supranote 14, infra note 18.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). Note that
individual actions seeking relief under state law or the federal Securities Act may continue to be
brought in state courts. See authorities cited supra notes 14, infra note 18.
18. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(1998). See generally Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation
Uniform StandardsAct of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999); David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard,
The Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct of 1998: The Sun Sets on California'sBlue Sky Laws,
54 Bus. LAW. 1 (1998); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a FalseAlarm: FederalPreemptionof State
Securities FraudCauses ofAction, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
19. See Marc I. Steinberg, State Securities Laws: A Panaceafor Investors?, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 53
(1994).
20. See, e.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES MALPRACTICE (1992); Douglas
M. Branson, Chasingthe Rogue ProfessionalAfter the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
50 SMU L. REV. 91 (1996); Ann Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central
Bank, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2185 (1996); Manning G. Warren, The Primary Liability of Securities
Lawyers, 50 SMU L. REv. 383 (1996).
21. See generally JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW (West Group 2004) (1985).
22. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal
and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 505-16 (1995).
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private actions under the USA even when they knowingly assist their clients in
committing illegal conduct. 23 As such, the scope of "seller" liability is often
construed in accordance with the Pinter test for "sellers," thereby ordinarily
precluding attorneys from being saddled with primary liability. 24 While the
USA expressly provides secondary liability for certain enumerated groups,
including "agents," 25 attorneys are not per se included within these categories.
Under this interpretative framework, as long as counsel's conduct is not such
that he could be said to be "soliciting" or "effecting" the transaction, liability
would not attach under the USA for a client's securities law violation even if
the attorney knew of, and assisted in, the client's violation of the state's
securities act. 26 Nevertheless, attorneys may expose themselves to "seller"

status under the state securities acts when they take an active role in the
enterprise or transaction. As a generality, primary liability as a seller under
state securities law may attach where the subject attorney would be considered
a seller under the Pintertest. 27 Hence, circumstances may arise where attorneys

may be primarily liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, while neither
28
primarily nor secondarily liable under the USA.
Secondary liability for attorneys under the USA can arise in a number of
situations. While the USA expressly provides secondary liability for certain
enumerated groups, including "agents,

29

it does not include attorneys per se

within these categories. Under this interpretative framework, as long as
counsel's conduct is not that of "soliciting" or "effecting" the transaction,
23. See infra notes 24, 28, 30, 64, 69-71 and accompanying text; see also CAL. CORP. CODE §
25504.1 (West 2005) (a non-Uniform Securities Act provision):
Any person who materially assists in any violation of Section 25110, 25120, 25130, 25133, or
25401, or a condition of qualification under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 25110) of
Part 2 of this division imposed pursuant to Section 25141, or a condition of qualification
under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 25120) of Part 2 of this division imposed
pursuant to Section 25141, or an order suspending trading issued pursuant to Section 25219,
with intent to deceive or defraud, is jointly and severally liable with any other person liable
under this chapter for such violation.
24. See infra note 62.
25. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b) (1956).
26. See infra notes 61-64, 69-76 and accompanying text. Depending on the applicable state, liability
under the common law (such as for aiding and abetting the primary violator's breach of fiduciary duty)
may attach. See Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170 (Del.
1976).
27. See Joesph C. Long, Developments and Issues in Civil Liability Under Blue Sky Law, 62 U.
CIN. L. REV. 439, 443 n.25 (1993).
28. UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT § 410(b) (1956).
29. See, e.g., CFT Seaside Inv. L.P. v. Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836 (D.S.C. 1994) (denying attorney
defendant's motion for summary judgment on § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims and granting attorney
defendant's motion for summary judgment on state securities law claims under South Carolina Uniform
Securities Act, § 35-1-1490 (primary liability provision; attorneys not sellers), and § 35-1-1500
(secondary liability provision; attorneys not "employees" or "agents")); see also Wenneman v. Brown
49 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (Utah 1999) (interpreting control person status under § 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Utah § 61-1-22(4)(a) (similar to USA § 410(b)) and allowing motion to dismiss
attorneys as control persons, but denying motion to dismiss attorneys as primarily liable under § 10(b)
and rule 1Ob-5).

Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws
liability would not attach under the USA for a client's securities law
violation-even if the attorney knew of, and assisted in, the client's violation
of the state's securities act. 30 When an attorney does become involved in a
client's business enterprise, state securities acts provide "status" liabilityliability for partners, officers, and directors. 31 An attorney involved in a client's
enterprise as a partner, officer, or director is exposed to liability, not as a result
of the attorney's status as counsel, but as a result of the attorney's role as a
partner, officer, or director of the subject enterprise.3 2 Moreover, if an attorney
becomes so involved in a client's enterprise that the attorney is deemed a
"control person,"' 33 the attorney faces liability exposure as a result of that
involvement. 34 On another front, an attorney working as in-house counsel has
potential liability due to the attorney's status as an "employee" of the corporate
primary violator. 35 While the USA also provides potential liability for "every
... agent who materially aids in the sale,' 36 attorneys generally are not held to
be agents for purposes of the USA, unless they do "something more" to
"effect" the sale. 37 Conceivably, a law firm under the USA could face
secondary liability as a "control person" of an affiliated attorney's primary
liability, 38 and law firm members could also be subject
to secondary liability
39
by virtue of being "partners" with the violative lawyer.
Significantly, several states have not adopted the USA or have modified its
provisions. 40 In these states, attorney liability exposure often depends on more
flexible "materially participating or aiding" language contained in the
applicable statute. Under these statutes, secondary liability premised on aider
principles may be imposed irrespective of the attorney's relationship with the
primary violator.4 '

30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
31. Many state securities acts are based on the USA which provides such liability. State courts
often have interpreted this liability to be "strict" based on status. See infra notes 88-92 and
accompanying text.
32. "Status" liability does not generally per se include attorneys as an enumerated class of persons
subject to liability. However, one can argue that attorneys are subject to status liability as "agents." This
argument has received mixed reactions. See infra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
33. The USA provides for "control person" liability in section 410(b). However, the Act does not
define "control person." State courts generally have applied the federal test for "control person"
liability. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 106.
35. The USA provides secondary liability for employees who provide material aid. See UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT § 410(b). Courts have held that the determinative test for whether one is an employee
is by reference to common law. See infra notes 118-20. As to whether the employee's aid is material,
see infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
36. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b).
37. See, e.g., Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990).
38. See infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 52-59, 116-17, 148-60, 166, 184-94, 210-13 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
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ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT

A. PrimaryLiability-Uniform Securities Act
1. Statutory Scheme
The federal securities acts heavily influenced the Uniform Securities Act,
which, in turn, laid the foundation for many of the current state securities
42
acts. One of the main goals of the USA is to provide uniformity between state
and federal securities laws. 43 Currently, there are three Uniform Securities Acts
(collectively referred to herein as the USA). The most widely adopted is the
Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (USA), which thirty-seven jurisdictions have
adopted "at one time or another, in whole or in part."" Nine jurisdictions have
adopted the Revised Uniform Securities Act of 1985 (RUSA), in whole or in
part.45 Seven jurisdictions have enacted the most recent Uniform Securities Act
of 2002 (2002 Act), in whole or in part, and several other states are considering
its adoption. 6 Because some jurisdictions have replaced former adoptions with
later versions, some version of the USA is in effect in approximately forty
states. States that have not adopted some version of the USA include: Arizona,
California, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
47
Tennessee, and Texas.
Civil liability is express under the USA, RUSA, and 2002 Act. 48 While the
42. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a)(2) cmt. (noting that the clause was nearly identical to §
12(2) [now § 12(a)(2)] of the Securities Act of 1933).
43. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 608 (2002); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §§ 704, 803 (1985);
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 415 (1956). The introductory comments to the 2002 Act state that it has
three overarching themes:
First, Section 608 articulates in greater detail than the 1956 Act Section 415 the objectives
of uniformity, cooperation among relevant state and federal governments and self-regulatory
organizations, investor protection and, to the extent practicable, capital formation. Section 608
is the reciprocal of the instruction on these subjects given by Congress in 1996 to the
Securities and Exchange Commission in Section 19(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. The
theme of uniformity and the aspiration of coordination of federal and state securities law is
particularly stressed in the Act and Official Comments. Section 602(f), consistent with the
Federal Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act of 1998, is a new provision encouraging
reciprocal state enforcement assistance.
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 608 introductory cmt. (2002).
44. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT prefatory cmt. at 1 (2002).
45. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT table ofjurisdictions (1985).
46. See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Securities Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/niformacts-fs-usa.asp (adopted in Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
47. For states that have adopted the 1956 Uniform Securities Act and the 1985 Revised Uniform
Securities
Act,
see
Legal
Information
Institute,
Uniform
Securities
Act,
http://www.law.comell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#secur (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
48. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(h) (1956) (the official comments to this section and to § 101
make it clear that it was not intended to create private civil liability for § 101). In the event a particular
jurisdiction has not enacted section 410(h), "the courts are split as to whether there is an implied cause
of action under Section 101." LONG, supra note 21, at 1:74 n.7 (citing cases). Courts may be influenced

Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws
USA and the 2002 Act contain a provision similar to rule 10b-5, 49 neither Act
provides private civil remedies for its violation. 50 Fundamentally different,
RUSA provides primary liability in private51actions based on a violation of a
provision substantially similar to rule 1Ob-5.
Some states that have based their securities acts on the USA have modified
the USA's liability provisions. For example, some states provide express civil
liability for violation of a provision similar to rule lOb-5.52 Moreover, a
number of states subject "every person who participates or materially aids in
the sale" giving rise to primary liability to secondary liability exposure. 53 For
states that impose civil liability based on a provision that is rule 1Ob-5's
counterpart, a key question is whether the provision is construed similarly to
Securities Act section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3), 54 with respect to which negligence is
to imply a private right of action to protect defrauded sellers, as section 410 only protects defrauded
buyers. Some states have modified this language to include defrauded sellers or have added an
additional provision. See Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 10-12 (6th Cir. 1980) (implying a private right
of action for defrauded sellers under Kentucky Securities Act, KRS § 292.320(1), Kentucky's version of
USA § 101); see also Martin C. McWilliams, Thoughts on Borrowing FederalSecurities Jurisprudence
Under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S.C. L. REV. 243, 270 (discussing the drafter's intent).
Section 509(m) of the 2002 Act expressly states that the Act "does not create a cause of action not
specified in this section or Section 411 (e)." UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT (2002). Comment 7 to section
501 of the 2002 Act states: "There is no private cause of action, express or implied, under Section 501.
Section 509(m) expressly provides that only Section 509 provides a private cause of action for conduct
that could violate Section 501." UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 501 cmt. 7 (2002).
49. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 101 (1956); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 501 (1985); UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT § 501 (2002):
It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security,
directly or indirectly:
(1) to employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) to make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon another person.
50. See supra note 48. See generally Jeannette Filippone, Comment., ClearerSkies for Investors:
ClearingFirm Liability Under the Uniform Securities Act, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1327, 1349 (2002).
51. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 605(a) (1985); see supra note 49.
52. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-12(a)(2) (2004) (similar to rule 1Ob-5); civil liability in § 105-14(a). Section 10-15-14(c) is substantially similar to USA § 410(b) (providing joint and several
secondary liability). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (2005) (similar to rule IOb-5), civil
liability is provided in § 21.20.430 (includes primary and secondary liability for purchasers and sellers).
Section 21.20.430(3) is substantially similar to USA §410(b) (providing joint and several secondary
liability).
53. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2002); TEX. REV. CIx. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2)
(Vernon 2005).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3) (2005). Section 17(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities or any securitybased swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
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the requisite mental state for liability, 55 or interpreted
similar to Exchange Act
56
section 10(b) which requires scienter for liability.
57
The civil liability provisions contained in the USA only protect buyers;
however, the 2002 Act has a parallel provision providing relief to sellers. 58 In
accordance with this change, some states have modified the language of the
USA's primary liability provision to apply to both sellers and buyers, and some
59
states have enacted parallel provisions protecting buyers as well as sellers.

The USA sets forth civil liabilities and remedies in section 410. Section
410(a)(1), similar to Securities Act section 12(a)(1), applies when the offer or
sale of a security results in a registration violation. Section 410(a)(2) is nearly
identical to Securities Act section 12(a)(2) but is more expansive in that it has
no prospectus limitation.

Significantly, courts have refused to read such a

operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
55. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). For cases interpreting state law, see, for example, In
re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 371 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (interpreting Florida
Securities Investors Protection Act (F.S.I.P.A.), Fla. Stat. § 517.211 (providing violations, similar to
rule 10b-5) and 517.301 (providing civil remedies for a breach of § 517.211)) ("Stating a cause of
action under the F.S.I.P.A. or Florida common law fraud is virtually identical to stating a claim under
Rule lOb-5 except that the scienter requirement under Florida law is satisfied by a showing of mere
negligence, whereas the minimum showing under Rule lOb-5 is reckless disregard.") (quoting
Gochnauerv. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1046 (llth Cir. 1987)); Gohlerv. Wood, 919
P.2d 561, 565 (Utah 1996) (refusing to require a reliance element in actions brought under Utah
Uniform Securities Act, § 61-1-22 (similar to USA § 410(a)), and making actionable a violation of § 61 1-22 (similar to rule 1Ob-5) because, as opposed to the federal implied cause of action "a cause of action
under the Utah Act's antifraud provisions has express elements. Consequently, this court has no need to
define these elements. Indeed, it would be inappropriate to do so when the legislature has already done
so."). See generally Keith A. Rowley, Muddy Waters, Blue Skies: Civil Liability Under the Mississippi
Securities Act, 70 MISS. L.J. 683 (2000) (analyzing civil liability provisions under the Mississippi
Securities Act); Comment., Proofof Fault in Actions for Securities Fraud:A Cloud in Pennsylvania's
Blue Sky, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1083 (1985) (arguing that the Pennsylvania's Securities Act does not
require scienter in a civil action brought under a provision similar to rule lOb-5; rather the provision
should be interpreted in line with Securities Act § 17(a)).
56. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). For cases interpreting state law, see, for
example, In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (interpreting Georgia
civil liability provision, Georgia Investor Protection Act, O.C.G.A § 10-5-12(a)(2)) ("The Georgia Act
is similar to Rule lOb-5, and requires the same elements of proof.") (citing Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921
F.2d 1465, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1991)). See also In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 322
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting aiding and abetting liability under the North Carolina Securities Act, § 78A8 (substantially similar to rule lOb-5), in light of the Supreme Court's rejection of aiding and abetting
liability in § 10(b) and rule IOb-5 claims in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (citing Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir.1994))).
57. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a)(2) (2002).

58. Id. The 2002 Act also provides secondary liability for violations of this provision in section
509(g): (g)(l) control person, (g)(2) "managing partner, executive officer, or director of a person
liable," (g)(3) "employee of or associated with a person liable," and (g)(4) "broker-dealer, agent,
investment adviser, or investment adviser representative that materially aids the conduct giving rise to
the liability." § 509(g).
59. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501(a) (2005) (seller liable to purchaser), PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 1-501(b) (2005) (purchaser liable to seller); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(l)-(2)
(Vernon 2005) (seller liable to purchaser), and 581-33B (Vernon 2005) (purchaser liable to seller).
60. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a) official cmts. (2002). Section 410(a)(2) provides:
(a) Any Person who...
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
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61
limitation into the respective state securities acts.

2. Post-PinterSellers
State courts often follow federal interpretations of similarly worded
statutes. 62 Since the USA was based on the federal securities acts, and USA
section 410(a)(2) significantly parallels Securities Act section 12(a)(2),63 state
courts generally have found the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Pinter
persuasive in defining the term "seller" and have rejected more expansive
standards, including the "substantial factor" test. 64 Some state courts, however,
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not
knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that
he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with
interest at six percent per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys'
fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security. Damages are the amount that
would be recoverable upon a tender less the value of the security when the buyer
disposed of it and interest at six percent per year from the date of disposition.
61. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee Co., 934 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. App. 1996).
62. See, e.g., Biales v. Young, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 (S.C. 1993) (adopting the Pinter test for sellers:
"Section 35-1-1490(2) [of the South Carolina Securities Act, S.C. Code 1976 § 35-1-1490(2)] is
substantially similar to section 12 of the Federal Securities Act. Accordingly, federal precedent,
although not binding, may be applied as guidance in interpretation."); In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F.
Supp. 2d at 1364-65 (attorneys are not liable as sellers under North Carolina Securities Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 78A-56(a)(2) because it "closely resembles Section 12 of the 1933 Securities Act" so the Pinter
test applies; attorneys are also not liable as "employees" or "agents" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A56(c)). Infocure interprets Mich. Comp. Laws § 451.8 10(a)(2) (primary liability provision), as being in
line with Pinter test for sellers as "Michigan courts have acknowledged interpretation of the federal
statute offers valuable guidance as to the interpretation of the state statute." Id. at 1365 (citing Kirkland
v. E.F. Hutton & and Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 444 (E.D. Mich. 1983)). See also California Amplifier, Inc.
v. RLI Ins. Co., 94 Cal. App. 4th 102, 114-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that "California courts may
look to federal statutes for guidance in interpreting a closely analogous state statute"). But see Siporin v.
Carrington, 23 P.3d 92, 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001):
Although Arizona courts have consistently been guided by the federal courts' interpretation of
the 1933 and 1934 federal Acts when applying the Arizona Securities Act, we will not defer
to federal case law when, by doing so, we would be taking a position inconsistent with the
policies embraced by our own legislature. We will depart from those federal decisions that do
not advance the Arizona policy of protecting the public from unscrupulous investment
promoters.
See also FDIC v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 937 F. Supp. 1461, 1473 (D. Colo. 1996):
The Colorado Supreme Court once held that federal precedent is persuasive in construing
similar language in Colorado securities law. People v. Riley, 708 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Colo.
1985). This is no longer the case. Rather, when construing a Colorado securities statute,
fundamental principles of statutory construction are employed before resorting to case law
regarding similar federal law ....
Moreover, state courts may find persuasive the interpretations of other states. See Lehn v. Dailey, 825
A.2d 140, 147 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) ("Additionally, because the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act,
General Statutes §§ 36b-2 to 36b-33, is a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the 1956
Uniform Securities Act, we may look to interpretations of that act in interpreting analogous language in
our own statutes.").
63. See supranote 62.
64. Generally, the substantial factor test classified one as a seller if such person was substantially
involved in or integrally connected with the subject transaction. See Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787
P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990). For pre-Pinterfederal court decisions adopting the substantial factor test, see,

Berkeley Business Law Journal

Vol. 3.1, 2005

have embraced broader interpretations. 65For instance, the Washington Supreme
Court declined to adhere to the Pinter test for purposes of the Washington
67
Securities Act, 66 opting for a "substantial contributive factor" test.

For jurisdictions that have adopted the Pintertest for sellers, activities that
do not expose attorneys to liability as a "seller" under the Securities Act
section 12 generally do not subject attorneys to "seller" status under the state
securities acts. 68 Just as in the federal cases, state courts have generally not
considered attorneys who solely provide legal services to be sellers. 69 Thus,
for example, Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d
709 (5th Cir. 1980).
Adoption by state courts of the Pintertest may represent the current prevailing view. See, e.g., In re
Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (applying Pintertest to South Carolina,
North Carolina, Michigan, and Florida); Meyers v. Lot, 993 P.2d 609, 613 (Idaho 2000) (adopting the
"financial benefit test" of Pinter); Wilson v. Misko, 508 N.W.2d 238, 248 (Neb. 1993) ("Following
Pinter, we hold that liability under the Securities Act of Nebraska.. extends only to a person who
successfully solicits [the] purchase of securities, motivated at least in part by desire to serve his or her
own financial interests or those of the securities owner."); Biales, 432 S.E.2d at 169 (adopting Pinter
approach and stating: "Section 35-1-1490(2) is substantially similar to section 12 of the Federal
Securities Act. Accordingly, federal precedent, although not binding, may be applied as guidance in
interpretation."); Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah 1996) (stating that UTAH CODE ANN. § 611- 22(1)(a) requires privity, that no reliance is required, without discussing Pinter); Shavin v.
Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 411 (Va. 1993) (applying Pinter test for sellers under the Virginia
Securities Act); see also Long, supra note 27, at 444-46 (discussing acceptance of Pinter).
65. Several states apparently have not adopted Pinter. See State ex rel. Mays v. Ridenhour, 811
P.2d 1220, 1234 (Kan. 1991); State ex rel. Goettsch v. Diacide Distrib., Inc., 561 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa
1997); Foster v. Jessup & Lamont Sec. Co., 482 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1986); Anders v. Dakota Land &
Dev. Co., 380 N.W.2d 862, 867-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1980); Cook v. Pepisco, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Blue Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 72,694 (Okla. Dist. Ct. 1987); Price v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370
(1988); Wade v. Skipper's Inc., 915 F.2d 1324, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law);
Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990); Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 964-65
(Wash. 1989); Haberman v. WPPSS, 744 P.2d 1032, 1051-52 (Wash. 1988). But see Victor v. Thomas
White & Co., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 94,548, at p. 93,509 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(interpreting California law, limiting the term "seller" to one who is in privity of contract with the
purchaser); accord Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982) (interpreting
California law).
66. Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 964 (Wash. 1989) (reaffirming position in Haberman v. Washington
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987)).
67. Hines, 787 P.2d at 20 (Wash. 1990) (quoting Haberman,744 P.2d at 1052):
Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant's conduct is a substantial
contributive factor in the sales transaction include: (1) the number of other factors which
contribute to the sale and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (2) whether
the defendant's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and
active operation up to the time of the sale, or has created a situation harmless unless acted
upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; and (3) lapse of time.
68. See, e.g., In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (interpreting
Mich. Comp. Laws § 451.810(a)(2) (primary liability provision), in line with Pintertest for sellers as
"Michigan courts have acknowledged interpretation of the federal statute offers valuable guidance as to
the interpretation of the state statute.") (citing Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 444 (D.
Mich. 1983)).
69. Waterside Capital Corp. v. Nat'l Assisted Living, 2002 WL 31990278, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept.
19, 2002):
A law firm representing a securities issuer has no liability if it provides only legal services.
If it solicits the sale for its client, it may. The Supreme Court in Pinterdid not exempt lawyers
from liability if they are motivated to serve the financial interests of the issuer of the
securities. A law firm representing a securities issuer is vulnerable to allegations of
solicitation when it allows its partners to mix their personal interests with their professional

Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws
lawyers have not been deemed sellers for the preparation of offering
documents that contained disclosure deficiencies. Likewise, courts normally
do not impose seller status on counsel
based on the rendering of legal advice or
71
the issuance of opinion letters.
Even under the "substantial contributive factor" test to ascertain "seller"
status, "something more" must be established than counsel's performance of

routine advisory drafting and related services. 72 Accordingly, courts draw a
distinction between rendering routine professional services with respect to an
offering and actively participating in sale transactions.7 3Applying this standard,
the Washington Supreme Court held that advice rendered by counsel regarding
74
the materiality of a contemplated disclosure constituted routine legal services.
Because counsel's services thus were customary professional services and no
evidence suggested that counsel participated in the solicitation process, the
subject attorneys were not a75 "substantial contributive factor" and were
therefore not deemed "sellers."

B. Secondary Liability (Status, ControlPerson, andAider Liability)-Uniform
SecuritiesActs

The USA provides secondary liability for an enumerated list of persons
responsibilities to the client. When such a law firm goes further and represents both sides of a
securities transaction, it makes itself a most tempting target for a former client whose
investment has become worthless.
Federal courts likewise hold that attorneys performing their professional services are not liable as
"sellers." See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1993). Applying the Pintertest to the Maryland Securities Act, MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11703(a) (1993), the court held that the defendant law firm's "preparation of the offering memorandum
and [its] fees for services rendered" did not bring the firm within the Pinter test for sellers; the law firm
did nothing "more than perform its their professional services." Id. at 375. The plaintiff (Baker Watts)
brought the action for contribution against its attorneys. Baker Watts had earlier been found liable to
investors who "alleged that the Confidential Offering Memorandum contained material omissions in
violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 1l-703(a)(l)(ii) of the Maryland
Securities Act." Id. at 362.
71. See, e.g., In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64 (applying Pintertest for sellers
under the South Carolina Uniform Security Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490(2)):
In this case, [the defendant law firm] did not sell or offer to sell Infocure's stock to the
Medfax Plaintiffs. Although it may have prepared certain documents and even provided an
opinion as to facts relevant to the transaction, settled law shows that these acts are insufficient
to create liability under Section 1490. To hold otherwise would impose possible liability for
every professional in a transactional setting.
See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp. 1231, 1245 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Pinter test to for
sellers) ("The court believes liability under Section 12 generally requires more active participation in
the solicitation than the mere drafting of an opinion letter." (citing Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986))), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991); see also, Allyn v. Wortman, 725 So. 2d 94 (Miss. 1998) (construing
California, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah law).
72. Hines v. Data Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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in section 410(b):
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection (a),
every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every person occupying a similar
status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller who
materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in
the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the
seller, unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did
not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
76 There is
contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable.

The USA thus sets forth exposure to secondary liability for five groups: (1)
control persons; (2) partners, officers, and directors; (3) persons performing
similar functions; (4) employees who materially aid; and (5) broker-dealers or
agents who materially aid.77 These five groups have a "quasi due diligence ' 78
affirmative defense-that they could not have known of "the existence of the
facts by which liability" arose if they had exercised reasonable care. 79 For
liability to attach to the first three groups, there is no condition
that they
8
provide material aid or otherwise participate in the transaction. 0
RUSA's secondary liability provision is similar to that of the USA, except
RUSA replaces the term "agent" with "sales representative.

81

By comparison,

76. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b) (1956).
77. See Kirchoff v. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 651 (Ind. 1998) (interpreting Indiana Securities Act.
Ind. Code 23-2-1-19(d) (based on UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b))).
78. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4211-18 (3d ed. 1992) (referring
to this defense in the context of Securities Act § 12(a)(2) claims). See generally UNIFORM SECURITIES
ACT § 410(b) cmt. (1956):
The defense of lack of knowledge is modeled on § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, and §
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The last sentence, with reference to
contribution, is a safeguard to avoid the common-law rule which prohibits contribution among
joint tort-feasors.
79. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101, 108 (Conn. 1997).
80. See Kirchoff, 703 N.E.2d at 651:
As the Court of Appeals held in Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979),
only the fourth and fifth categories require personal participation in the transaction. The
statute does not require a partner, officer, director or controlling person to materially aid a
violation to be liable. [I]t seems apparent that this statutory provision imposes absolute
liability upon the director of a corporation to purchasers of securities sold in violation of the
Securities Act based on his position as a director unless he proves the statutory defense. It
should be observed that the clause in question [materially aids] obviously relates only to
employees of the seller, broker-dealers or agents. Id. at 433-34. Other jurisdictions have
construed statutes identical to Indiana Code § 23-2-1-19(d) in a similar fashion. See Moerman
v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), affd 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970)
(employee must materially aid the sale to be liable but there are no restrictions on the liability
of a partner, officer or director); Foelker v. Kwake, 568 P.2d 1369 (Or. 1977) (personal
participation not necessary to impose liability on officer of corporation); Mitchell v. Beard,
513 S.W.2d 905 (Ark. 1974) (an employee, broker or agent must materially aid in the sale
before becoming liable, but that requirement is not applicable to a partner); Rzepka v. Farm
Estates, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (directors and officers liable where they
did not establish statutory defense of lack of knowledge).
81. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 605(d) (1985):
A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under subsection (a)
or (c), a partner, officer, or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions, an employee of the person liable if the employee materially aids
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the 2002 Act contains four separate provisions setting forth secondary liability
exposure for different groups: (1) control persons; (2) "managing partner[s],
executive officer[s], or director[s] of a person liable;" (3) "employee[s] of or
associated with a person liable ... who materially aid[ ] the conduct giving rise
to the liability;" and (4) "broker-dealer[s], agent[s], investment adviser[s], or
investment adviser 82
representative[s] that materially aid[s] the conduct giving
rise to the liability."
Secondary liability under the state securities acts is derivative: if the seller
cannot be held liable, then the non-seller is not liable. 83 Consequently,
in the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation, and a broker-dealer or sales
representative who materially aids in the act, omission, or transaction constituting the
violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person,
but it is a defense that the person did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of the existence of the facts by which the liability is alleged to exist. With
respect to a person who, directly or indirectly, controls another person who is liable under
subsection (c), it is also a defense that the controlling person acted in good faith and did not,
directly or indirectly, induce the act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation.
Contribution among the several persons liable is the same as in cases arising out of breach of
contract.
82. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509(g) (2002) (§ 509(b) is the primary liability provision
providing liability for a material misrepresentation or half-truth in the sale of securities, and § 509(c) is
a parallel provision providing liability for purchasers):
(g) The following persons are liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
persons liable under subsections (b) through (f):
(1) a person that directly or indirectly controls a person liable under subsections (b)
through (f), unless the controlling person sustains the burden of proof that the person did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence
of conduct by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist;
(2) an individual who is a managing partner, executive officer, or director of a person
liable under subsections (b) through (f), including an individual having a similar status or
performing similar functions, unless the individual sustains the burden of proof that the
individual did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
the existence of conduct by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist;
(3) an individual who is an employee of or associated with a person liable under
subsections (b) through (f) and who materially aids the conduct giving rise to the
liability, unless the individual sustains the burden of proof that the individual did not
know and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of
conduct by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist; and
(4) a person that is a broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser
representative that materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liability under
subsections (b) through (f), unless the person sustains the burden of proof that the person
did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
existence of conduct by reason of which liability is alleged to exist.
83. See, e.g., S.W. Okla. Dev. Auth. v. Sullivan Engine Works, Inc., 910 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Okla.
1996) (interpreting 71 OKLA. STAT. § 408(b) (repealed by Laws 2003, c. 347, at 53, eff. July 1, 2004),
which provided secondary liability for a violation of section 408(a)):
We find material participants are jointly and severally liable with the seller under the terms of
§ 408(b) and that "primary liability" need not be adjudged by a court before bringing an
action against the material participant or aider. Rather, we conclude that a plaintiff need only
show that seller committed the prohibited acts of § 408(a) in its action against the material
participant or aider, and may recover damages from the material participant without obtaining
a judgment from seller or recovering from seller.
See Summers v. Welltech, 935 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Tex. 1996) (It is "[u]nnecessary to join the seller as
a party as long as the evidence showed the defendant's control over the seller and a violation of the
Securities Act by the seller."); Daniel Boone Area Sch. Dist. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d
400, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that for a secondary actor to be liable under 70 PA. CONS. STAT.
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84
secondary actors can be liable to the same extent as the primary violator.

States are divided on whether this limitation requires a primary violator to be
held liable and whether it requires a plaintiff to bring an action against the
primary violator. 85 As secondary liability is predicated on the existence of a
primary violation, non-sellers should arguably be able to assert both the
86
statutory defenses available to non-sellers as well as those provided to sellers.
1. No ParticipationRequiredfor Liability

a. Status Liability-Partners, Officers, and Directors
Courts have interpreted the USA as imposing liability on partners, officers,
and directors, including attorneys who serve as directors, 87 unless they satisfy
the burden of an affirmative defense. 88 Control person status or the degree of
participation does not determine liability for such persons; 89 rather, status as a
ANN. § 1- 503(a) the primary must be adjudicated liable under § 501); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles &
Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 369 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (stating that for a control person to be liable
under Maryland Securities Act § 11-703(c)(1), a primary violator must be adjudicated liable).
84. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b) (1956).
85. See sources cited supra note 83.
86. For example, the Texas Securities Act provides different defenses to the levying of secondary
liability than what is provided for primary liability. Compare TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. § 58133A(2) (Vernon 2005), with § 581-33F.
87. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, LAWYERING AND ETHICS FOR THE BUSINESS ATTORNEY

131-47 (2002); Micalyn S. Harris & Karen L. Valihura, Outside Counsel as Director: The Pros and
Potential Pitfalls of Dual Service, 53 Bus. LAw. 479 (1998); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and
Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in CorporateRepresentations, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179
(2001); Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Lawyer Serving as Director of Client
Corporation, A.B.A. FORMAL ETHICS OPINION 98-410 (1998) (discussing lawyers serving as directors
of client corporations).
88. See Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188, 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding officers
"clearly liable" under Michigan Uniform Securities Act, M.C.L. § 451.810(b) (based on USA § 410(b));
Kirchoff v. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 651 (Ind. 1998) (citing cases); Taylor v. Perdition Minerals Group,
Ltd., 766 P.2d 805, 809 (Kan. 1988) (citing cases) ("The states that have passed § 410(b) of the
Uniform Securities Act have consistently interpreted the statute to impose strict liability on partners,
officers, and directors unless the statutory defense of lack of knowledge is proven.") (holding K.S.A.
17-1268(b) (Supp. 1987) "is substantially similar to § 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act, 7B U.L.A.
643 (1958)," id. at 806).
Courts sometimes interpret the defense in a similar fashion to the "good faith" defense in the federal
securities acts for control persons. See Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2001)
(interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(C) (West 2005) (holding that directors acted reasonably in
relying on internal reporting systems and therefore sustained the burden of proof on a "good faith
defense").
89. See Hines v. Data Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 16-17 (Wash. 1990) (citing Moerman v. ZIPCO Inc.,
302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Mitchell v. Beard, 513 S.W.2d 905 (Ark. 1974); Taylor v. Perdition
Minerals Group Ltd, 766 P.2d 805 (Kan. 1988); Rzepka v. Farm States, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978); Foelker v. Kwake, 568 P.2d 1369 (Or. 1977)) (applying WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(3)
(2005) which is substantially similar to USA § 410(b)):
RCW 21.20.430(3) expressly makes all directors of an issuing corporation liable to the
same extent as the seller who violates the State Securities Act, subject to the due diligence
defense which each director bears the burden of proving....
The statute clearly does not distinguish between "inside" and "outside" directors, and
liability may exist without control person status. While no Washington case directly addresses
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partner, officer or director is the basis for liability. 90 Nonetheless, if a material
modification to the structure of the provision is enacted by a subject
jurisdiction, a different result may eventuate. 9 1 For instance, North Dakota
refuses to impose status liability in this context, requiring officers or92directors
to have "participated or aided" in the sale giving rise to the violation.
b. Control Person Liability
While both the federal securities acts 93 and the USA expressly define
the specific language in question, the courts of several other states with Blue Sky laws
substantially identical to Washington's have addressed this precise question and have
concluded that the plain language should be given its obvious meaning.
90. See Hines, 787 P.2d at 16-17; Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 879 (Utah 1995) (applying
Utah Uniform Securities Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(2)) ("Ignorance of a particular transaction is
not exculpatory because officers and directors are liable if, in the exercise of reasonable care, they could
have known."); sources cited supra note 89. The Official Comments to the 2002 Act indicate a
continuation of status liability, without a requirement of participation. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509
cmt. 10 (2002):
Under Section 509(g)(2) partners, officers, and directors are liable, subject to the defense
afforded by that subsection, without proof that they aided in the sale. In Section 509(g)(2), the
term "partner" is intended to be limited to partners with management responsibilities, rather
than a partner with a passive investment.
91. See Naranjo v. Paull, 803 P.2d 254, 265 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-13-42 (1978) (repealed) (replaced by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40(F), current statute is based on
USA § 605 (1985) (citation omitted)):
After stating that every sale of securities made in violation of the Act is voidable at the
election of the purchaser, the Act provides, "The person making such sale . .. and every
director, officer, salesman or agent of or for such seller who participated or aided in any way
in making such sale, shall be jointly and severally liable to such purchaser... " There may
be sound policy reasons for interpreting the words "participated or aided in any way" broadly
in favor of liability. But those words would be deprived of meaning if we held that every
director and officer, solely by reason of his or her position, is liable under this provision.
The current version of this provision in the New Mexico Securities Act contains different language
not limiting liability for directors and officers by participation. As such it would likely render a different
result: A person who directly or indirectly controls another person who is liable under Subsection A, B,
C, D or E of this section, a partner, officer or director of the person liable, a person occupying a similar
status or performing similar functions, any agent of the person liable, an employee of the person liable if
the employee materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the violation and a brokerdealer or sales representative who materially aids in the act, omission or transaction constituting the
violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the other person, but it is a
defense that they did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
existence of the facts by which the liability exists. Contribution among the several persons liable is the
same as in cases arising out of breach of contract. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40(F) (West 2003).
92. North Dakota Securities Act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (2005): "[E]very director, officer,
or agent of or for such seller who shall have participated or aided in any way in making such sale .. "
See Narum v. Faxx Foods, Inc., 590 N.W.2d 454, 459 (N.D. 1999) ("If corporate securities are sold in
violation of the [North Dakota] Securities Act, the corporate directors may incur liability to the
purchasers of the securities, irrespective of the care and diligence they exercised, if they participated or
aided in any way in making the illegal sales.").
93. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (2005):
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of
this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77o (2005):
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to
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Federal courts

generally interpret the different language of the Securities Act's 96 and the
Exchange Act's 97 control person provisions identically. Likewise, federal
courts normally construe state securities control person provisions in
conformity with the federal interpretations. 98 Similarly, when the state courts
99
define the term "control," they generally refer to federal court interpretations.

While these interpretations may differ from the language of the applicable
statutes, they promote the coordination of the federal and state securities
laws. 100
Under the USA, a control person carries the burden to establish a "good
faith" defense.10 1For example, in construing the statutory language for control
person liability under that state's securities act, the Washington Supreme Court
opined:
[T]he investors need show only that the defendant "directly or indirectly
control[led] [the] seller." The statute does not require the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant "culpably participated" in the alleged violation. Instead, the statute
clearly shifts the burden onto the defendant to prove that "he or she did not know,

or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 11
or 12 [15 U.S.C. § 77k or 771 of this title], shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to
the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist.
94. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b) (1956); supra note 76 and accompanying text.
95. Federal and state courts have referred to the definition of "control" used by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). See, e.g., Neely v. Bar Harbor Bankshares, 270 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53
(D. Me. 2003) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) ("control" means "the possession, direct or indirect, of
the power to direct or to cause the direction of the management and policies of [an entity], whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.")); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles &
Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 371 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.405). The SEC
defines "control" as:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled by" and "under common
control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005).
96. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77o (2005); supra note 93.
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2005); supra note 93; see, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914
F.2d 1564, 1578 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Although § 15 [of the Securities Act] is not identical to § 20(a) [of
the Exchange Act], the controlling person analysis is the same.").
98. See supra note 62.
99. Baker, 620 A.2d at 369-72. Federal courts are apt to do so as well. See Neely, 270 F. Supp. 2d
at 53 (defending "good faith" for Revised Maine Securities Act, 32 ME. REv. STAT. § 10605(3)); StatTech Liquidating Trust v. Fenster, 981 F. Supp. 1325, 1337 (D. Colo. 1997) (The language of COLO.
REv. STAT. 11-51-604(5)(b) [Colorado Securities Act control person provision] is substantially similar
to that employed in USA § 20(a) (1934) of the 1934 Act, and federal precedent is persuasive in
construing parallel provisions of the Colorado Securities Act.).
100. See supranote 43.
101. See E. Vanguard Forex Ltd. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 79 P.3d 86, 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Minn. 1992); see also Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
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and in the exercise
102 of reasonable care could not have known" of the liabilityproducing facts.

c. Attorney Liability Due to Status
An attorney becoming involved in a client's enterprise as a partner, officer,
or director is exposed to liability under the Uniform Securities Act not as a
result of the attorney's status as an attorney but as a result of the attorney's

status as a partner, officer, or director. In this context, attorneys and law firms
face potential secondary liability on two different fronts as a result of being a
partner, officer, or director of a primary violator, being a control person, or
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 10 3 The first situation arises when a
102. Hines v. Data Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 14 (Wash. 1990) (interpreting RCW 21.20.430(3),
rejecting the "culpable participation" test as used in Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889890 (3d Cir. 1975)), and noting with approval the analysis of Metge, 762 F.2d at 631); see also StatTech, 981 F. Supp. at 1337 (interpreting Colorado Securities Act control person provision, COLO. REv.
STAT. § 11-51-604(5)(b) (2005)):
In order to establish a prima facie case of control person liability, the plaintiff must present
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that (a) a primary violation of
the securities laws occurred; and (b) the defendant controlled the person or entity committing
the primary violation. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of control person
liability, the defendant has the burden of showing that it acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
103. A law firm potentially faces imputed liability under respondeat superior as a result of a
securities law violation committed by its attorney in the ordinary course of business. Note that where a
partner of a law firm also serves as an officer or director of a company, the partner "may be acting in
both capacities simultaneously where certain business transactions are being conducted." Schneiter v.
CTI Indus. Corp., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5022, at *5-6 (N.D. 11.Jan. 20, 1987) (denying defendant law
firm's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for law firm's "vicarious" liability); In re Rospatch
Sec. Litig., 1991 WL 671073, at *2-3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 1991) (denying defendant law firm's
motion to dismiss as there is a factual question whether [a partner], in acting as a director, was acting in
the ordinary course of [the law firm's] business or with the authority of his copartners").
Based on the Exchange Act's express secondary liability in the form of control person liability,
section 20(a), lower federal courts have addressed whether that provision supplants or supplements the
doctrine of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-78 (9th
Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("[W]e now join several other circuits in holding that § 20(a) was intended to
supplement, and not to supplant, the common law theory of respondeatsuperioras a basis for vicarious
liability in securities cases."). This same issue could emerge in the context of the USA, which provides
express secondary liability in greater detail; however, the 2002 Act, for instance, has a "saving
provision." UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT § 509(m) (2002) ("The rights and remedies provided by this
[Act] are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist, but this [Act] does not create a cause
of action not specified in this section or Section 411 (e)."). Furthermore, respondeat superior may be
viewed as qualitatively different than the statutory liability: respondeat superiorholds "principals or
employers vicariously liable for acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their authority or
employment." Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003); accord FDIC v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 937 F. Supp. 1461, 1471 (D. Colo. 1996):
Principles of respondeatsuperiorimpose liability on a corporation as employer for the acts of
an employee which have been assigned to her by the employer or if she is doing what is
necessarily incidental to her assigned work. Under respondeat superior, an employee's actions

are imputed to the employer.
See also id. at 1473 (holding respondeatsuperiorapplicable under Colorado Securities Act).
Without directly addressing the issue, the Supreme Court arguably assumed the application of
respondeat superiorin federal securities cases. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 154 (1972) ("The liability of the bank, of course, is coextensive with that of [the bank
employees]"); see also Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Implementing the
Preposterous: The PrematureDemise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO
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client allegedly is primarily liable either for selling unregistered securities or
for selling securities based on a material misrepresentation or half-truth.
Client's counsel faces control person liability exposure because counsel
allegedly has the ability to ensure that the registration requirements are adhered
to and can control the veracity of statements made in the offering document.
Accordingly, if the primary violator fails to comply with the registration
mandates or to truthfully disclose material information in the offering
document, counsel ostensibly has the ability to control such a deficiency. The
Washington Supreme Court refused to find attorneys liable as control persons
under this rationale. 104 Likewise, federal courts generally decline to hold
attorneys liable under this approach for the purposes of the control person
provisions of the federal securities laws. 105 However, depending on the
circumstances, a law firm may be deemed a controlling person based on its
heavy involvement in the corporation's affairs, including law firm counsel
06
serving on the alleged primary violator's board of directors.'
The second situation in which control person liability exposure arises for a
law firm is when an alleged primary violator is a member of the firm. When a
law firm attorney commits a primary securities law violation during the course
of representing a subject client, the firm is likewise subject to liability

ST. L.J. 1325, 1357 (1997) ("More importantly, the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly decided Section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 cases where the defendants were entities that could be held liable only on agency
principles.") (discussing cases). However, the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank called into
question the continued viability of respondeat superior liability in cases brought under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 thereunder. Justice Stevens's dissent noted that the majority's
approach "at the very least casts serious doubt ... on other forms of secondary liability" and lower
court decisions that "controlling person" liability supplemented rather than supplanted "respondeat
superior and other common-law agency principles ... " Id. at 201 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Despite
this, respondeat superior continues to be applied in federal securities cases. See, e.g., Seolas v.
Bilzerian, 951 F. Supp. 978 (D. Utah 1997).
104. Hines, 787 P.2d at 20-21.
105. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Stames & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986)
(applying control person provisions of federal securities acts, the law firm's "ability to persuade and
give counsel is not the same thing as 'control,' which almost always means the practical ability to direct
the actions of the people who issue or sell the securities."). But see Seidel v. Pub. Serv. Co., 616 F.
Supp. 1342, 1362 (D.N.H. 1985) (rejecting law firm's motion to dismiss and allowing claims under the
federal securities acts control person provisions to proceed: "Attorneys fall within the ambit of
'controlling persons' when they are in some sense culpable participants in the acts perpetrated by the
controlled person.") (citing Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Westlake v.
Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 349 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Felts v. Nat'l Account Sys. Assoc., Inc., 469 F. Supp.
54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978)). It is difficult to perceive that a corporation and its board of directors would
not follow the advice of counsel in situations concerning documents to be issued for examination by
prospective investors, particularly where such documents bear the imprimatur of expertise on the part of
such counsel.
106. See In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that,
where a managing partner was on the board of directors and his law firm "was heavily involved" in the
corporation's affairs, the managing partner and law firm had "substantial power to influence" the
primary violator and could be control persons for purposes of the federal securities laws); In re
Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,939 at 93,981 (W.D. Mich.
1992) ("A jury could reasonably conclude that [the law firm and managing partner] in their role as
lawyers exercised effective control of [defendant corporation] for purposes of Section 20.").
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exposure. 10 7 A different issue arises when a member of a law firm engages in
business dealings with the subject client. Such business relationships may be
viewed as both outside the ordinary course of business of the law firm and not
done on behalf of the firm.' 0 8 As such, as a generalization, it should not be
sufficient in this setting that a law firm merely controlled a member's practice
to impose control person liability on that firm. 10 9 For instance, in Semrad v.
Edina Realty, Inc., 10a real estate broker had an extensive side business
dealing in unregistered mortgage-based securities. Absolving the real estate
brokerage from liability as a control person for the broker's primary liability
under the Minnesota Uniform Securities Act, the court opined: "[W]here the
employer is not in the securities business, it would seem inappropriate to find
the requisite control based only on the employer's supervision of the employee
in carrying out the employer's business.""' Another court similarly held that,
absent evidence that the defendant law firm "knew or should have known that
[the former partner] was selling securities, [the law firm] cannot be held to
have 'directly or indirectly control[led]' his actions within the meaning of the
statute."112
2. ParticipationRequiredFor Liability-MaterialAiders

The USA sets forth secondary liability exposure for employees of the
seller, broker-dealers, and agents if they materially aid in the sale. 13 For an
attorney to be liable under USA section 410(b), an attorney must be a member
of these enumerated groups and be deemed to have "materially aid[ed] in the

sale."1

4

In jurisdictions that have adopted this provision without modification,

107. Such liability may be premised on agency principles, partnership law, control person analysis,
and respondeat superior doctrine. See, e.g., Sheinkopf v. Stone, 972 F.2d 1259, 1268 (1st Cir. 1991);
Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1572-78 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
185 (3d Cir. 1981).
108. See Sheinkopf 927 F.2d at 1268 ("It is theoretically possible that, even in the absence of an
attorney-client relationship, a law firm could be liable for a partner's actions in spheres beyond the
practice of law if the firm authorized those actions to be taken on its behalf."). With respect to business
transactions between counsel and client, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2004);
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Acquiring Ownership Interest in a Client in
Connection with Legal Services, A.B.A. FORMAL ETHICs OPINION 00-418 (2002) (on acquiring
ownership interest in a client connection with legal services); Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking
Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2001).
109. See Sheinkopf 927 F.2d at 1265 ("The fact that a person is a lawyer... does not mean that
every relationship he undertakes is, or reasonably can be perceived as being, in his professional
capacity.").
110. 493 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1992).
111. Id.at 533. Applying the Metge test, 762 F.2d at 631 (8th Cir. 1985), to MINN. STAT. ANN. §
80A.23(3), the court opined that "defendants lacked the practical ability to control the activities that
constituted [the real estate broker's] securities violations. Consequently, the second prong of the Metge
test has not been established."
112. Heath v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, PA., 388 S.E.2d 178, 183 (N.C. App. 1990).
113. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(b) (1956); supranote 76 and accompanying text.
114. § 410(b).
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an attorney who serves as in-house counsel is subject to liability risk.' 15
Another key issue is whether attorneys may be liable as "agents" under
USA section 410(b). Moreover, in certain states such as Oregon, where the
secondary liability provision deviates from the USA by providing liability for
"every person who participates or materially aids in the sale, ' 16 attention may
focus on whether an attorney's normal professional services constitute material
117
aid.
a. Attorneys Potentially Liable for Providing Material Aid
Attorneys are potentially liable under the USA as material aiders when
they, like anyone else, fall into one of the three statutory categories. Section
410(b) provides for secondary liability exposure for employees of the seller,
broker-dealers, and agents if they "materially aid" in the sale. Broker-dealers
and agents are defined groups under the USA. Status as an employee is
determined by reference to common law.118 Normally, in-house counsel is
deemed an employee," l 9 and outside counsel is viewed as an independent
20
contractor, not an employee.
Of these three categories, outside counsel faces the greatest likelihood of
115. Certainly, inside counsel normally are employees of the subject corporation. See Marc I.
Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the 1990s: A View from Outside, 49 SMU L. REV. 483, 484-85
(1996).
116. OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2005):
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection (1)of this
section, every partner, limited liability company manager, including a member who is a
manager, officer or director of such seller, every person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions, and every person who participates or materially aids in the sale
is also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller, unless the
nonseller sustains the burden of proof that the nonseller did not know, and, in the exercise of
reasonable care, could not have known, of the existence of facts on which the liability is
based. Any person held liable under this section shall be entitled to contribution from those
jointly and severally liable with that person.
'Every person,' as used in that statute, includes attorneys, and no privilege for statements of attorneys
who participate or materially aid in an unlawful sale of securities has been recognized by the courts."
Towery v. Lucas, 876 P.2d 814, 819 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that "every person" includes attorneys
and that the courts have recognized no privilege for attorneys who participate or materially aid in an
unlawful sale of securities) (citing Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1371-72 (Or. 1988)); Adams v.
Am. W. Sec., 510 P.2d 838 (Or. 1973).
117. See Prince,764 P.2d at 1371; infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
118. See LONG, supra note 21, § 9.88, at 449 (citing Kirchoff,703 N.E.2d 644) (defining employee
by reference to common law).
119. By reference to common law, in-house counsel, as opposed to outside counsel, would likely
be deemed an employee rather than an independent contractor. See supra note 120.
120. See CFT Seaside Inv. L.P. v. Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836 (D.S.C. 1994) (granting motion for
summary judgment against outside attorney defendants under South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, §
35-1-1500); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 373 (Md. App. 1993) (holding
defendant law firm was an independent contractor and not an "employee" under the Maryland
Securities Act, § 11-703(c)); Allen v. Columbia Fin. Mgmt., Ltd., 377 S.E.2d 352, 356-357 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (determining outside attorneys were not "employees" under South Carolina provision
similar to USA § 410(b), stating "[t]he principal factor that makes one an employee, or servant, rather
than an independent contractor is the right of the employer, or master, to control and direct the
particular work or undertaking as to the means or manner of its accomplishment").
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being considered an agent. 121 Whether attorneys are "agents" per se for
purposes of the statute is a matter of some dispute. 122 "Agents" are a defined
group in the USA-individuals who effect or attempt to effect securities
transactions. 123 The prevailing view is that counsel does not meet this
definition because counsel does not "effect" the purchase or sale. 124 Thus,
under this approach, attorneys are not "agents" under the USA26 for drafting
25
or rendering opinion letters.
disclosures in offering documents
Two lines of reasoning support the prevailing view that attorneys who
1 27
provide their normal professional services are not "agents" under the USA.
121. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. See discussion infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. Compare Powell v. H.E.F. P'ship,
835 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Vt. 1993) ("For purposes of the Vermont Securities Act 'agent' is defined as
,salesman,' in addition to its ordinary meaning. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202(1). Plaintiffs are correct in
asserting that an attorney acting on behalf of a client does so as the client's agent."), with Arthur Young
& Co. v. Mariner Corp., 630 So. 2d 1199, 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("In light of both the
legislative purpose and the context of the surrounding body of law into which section 517.211 and
,agent' must be integrated, we conclude that its use in this section means to incorporate the common
law definition of agency.").
123. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(b) (1956).
124. See Baker, 620 A.2d at 368:
Although the definition of "agent" in the state securities laws . . . may vary to differing
degrees from the definition in § 11-101(b), they each have one thing in common: they do not
impose liability upon an attorney who merely provides legal services or prepares documents
for his or her client. To impose liability, the attorney must do something more than act as
legal counsel.
See In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2002) ("[I]t is my opinion that
attorneys for the seller, who perform duties within the normal ambit of transactional professionals, may
not be held liable as an 'employee' or 'agent' of the seller who materially aided in the sale of
securities." (interpreting secondary liability provision of Michigan Securities Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
451.810(b) as similar to USA § 410(b)).
125. See Baker, 620 A.2d at 368:
Therefore, we hold that an attorney could conceivably be considered an agent if he or she
"represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect the purchase or sale of
securities." In order to be considered an "agent," an attorney must act in a manner that goes
beyond legal representation. The definition of "agent" in § 1 1-101(b) does not include
attorneys who merely provide legal services, draft documents for use in the purchase or sale
of securities, or engage in their profession's traditional advisory finctions. To rise to the level
of effecting the purchase or sale of securities, the attorney must actively assist in offering
securities for sale, solicit offers to buy, or actually perform the sale.
126. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1989), affd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting secondary liability provision of
Indiana Securities Act, IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19(b), attorney and law firm not liable as "agent" as "no
evidence suggests that [the attorney] or his firm personally and actively employed the opinion letter to
solicit investors. In other words, [the attorney] and his firm cannot be said to have effected or attempted
to effect the sale of a security. Liability under the Indiana Securities Act requires something more than
the mere drafting of an opinion letter.").
127. Criticisms of the two approaches include that the first rationale is contrary to the drafters'
intent-the implication of the prefatory phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" to the
definitional sections of the three acts. Arthur Young & Co., 630 So. 2d at 1202 (concluding that this
prefatory language "permits the court to consider the context of the use of the word 'agent' and to reject
the statutory definition if it does not fit the context."); Long, supra note 27, at 466 n. 157. As to the
second analytical approach, it has been noted that it is not entirely inconsistent to apply the common
law definition to section 410(b) while not to the section requiring agents to be registered. See Baker,
620 A.2d at 167-68, 171. In further support of that proposition could be noted the prefatory phrase to
the definitional section, "unless the context otherwise requires," which would allow flexibility in
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The first approach posits that the statutory definition of "agent" controls.
Therefore, for an attorney to be an "agent" under the statute, the attorney must
"effect" the purchase or sale. 128 Hence, the scope of the term "agent"

encompasses "any individual other than a broker-dealer who represents a
broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities ....,129 For example, in Johnson v. Colip, 130 the court addressed the
definition of "agent" in the state's securities act, reasoning:
[W]hile one must be a common law agent to be an 'agent' under the Act, we
perceive the Act as containing additional requirements as well. That is, whether [an
attorney] is an agent within the meaning of the Act13turns
on whether he effected or
1
attempted to effect purchases or sales of securities.

applying the definitions in different parts of the Act. Id.
128. See, e.g., In re Infocure Sec. Litig., 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1364:
As to the agency argument, the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act provides its own
definition for the term "agent" as: [A]ny individual, other than a broker-dealer, who
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities . . . . A partner, officer or director of a broker-dealer or issuer, or a person
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, is an agent if he or she is within
this definition.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(2). The district court in CFTSeaside held that this definition does not cover
professionals such as attorneys engaged in their traditional advisory functions. CFT Seaside, 868 F.
Supp. at 844. The definition, instead, "covers persons who assist directly in offering securities for sale,
soliciting offers to buy, or performing the sale, but who do not fit the definition of broker-dealer." Id.
Nothing in the record here suggests that MM & M stepped outside the bounds of attorneys in a run-ofthe-mill merger transaction. It is clear to me that MM & M is not subject to liability under the
provisions of Section 1500. The Plaintiffs' request for summary judgment is denied as to the South
Carolina Uniform Securities Act, and the Defendant's motion is granted.
See also Kirchoffv. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 651 (Ind. 1998):
Whether a person is an officer or director, a controlling person, or an employee is a question
of fact governed by common law. In contrast, 'agent' and 'broker-dealer' are defined terms,
and the determination of who is an agent or broker-dealer is governed by the statute ....
Accordingly, common law agents for some purposes are not necessarily 'agents' as used in
the statute.
129. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(b) (1956); see also CFT Seaside Inv. L.P. v. Hammet, 868
F. Supp. 836 (D.S.C. 1994) (denying motion for summary judgment on § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims
against attorney defendants; granting motion for summary judgment against attorney defendants under
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act, § 35-1-1490 (attorneys not sellers) and § 35-1-1500 (attorneys
not "employees" or "agents")); sources cited supra note 128; infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
130. 658 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Ind. 1995).
131. Id. "At issue is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether [the attorney] was
an agent of the other defendants and, if so, whether he "materially aided in the sale of securities herein
and was, therefore, liable to plaintiffs under the Act." Id.at 576 (quoting IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19 (2005)
(based on USA § 410(b)). The issue arose in the context of an attorney who participated in meetings
with prospective investors, and although he drafted the prospectuses alleged to contain material
misstatements or omissions, his potential liability arose from his alleged acts to effect sales during the
meetings and not his legal work. Id. at 576. In affirming the reversal of summary judgment for the
defendant-attorney, the court held for purposes of Indiana Code section 410(b):
[An attorney is an agent if [his] or her affirmative conduct or failure to act when reasonably
expected to do so at a meeting of prospective investors made it more likely than not that the
investors would purchase the securities than they would have been without such conduct or
failure to act.
Id at 578. Applying this standard, the Indiana Supreme Court viewed whether the attorney was an agent
as "a genuine issue of fact" based on the primary purpose of such attorney's role:
For example, if when called upon at the meetings, [the attorney Colip] primarily reassured
investors that risks about which they expressed concern were unlikely to materialize, such
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The second approach is premised on statutory construction. Since the USA
requires "agents," but not attorneys, to be registered, attorneys cannot be
"agents" within the scope of the USA. 132 Courts sometimes apply both
analytical approaches. For instance, in CFT Seaside Inv. Ltd. Partnershipv.

Hammet,133 the court opined:
The definition of "agent" in [South Carolina Uniform Securities Act] § 35-1-20(2)
does not include attorneys who merely render legal advice or draft documents for
use in securities transactions. The definition covers persons who assist directly in
offering securities for sale, soliciting offers to buy, or performing the sale, but who
do not fit the definition of broker-dealer. It is not intended to cover professionals
such as attorneys engaging in their traditional advisory functions. This is shown by
§ 35-1-410 which provides: "It is unlawful for any person to transact business in
this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless so licensed under this chapter."
Nowhere does Title 35 require attorneys who merely advise persons involved in a
securities transaction to be licensed before providing that advice. Nor do the
regulations of the South Carolina Secretary of State, Securities Division ...
Therefore, Defendants are not liable as "agents" under § 35-1-1500.134

Substantively consistent with the courts' use of the statutory definition for

behavior made it more likely than not that the investors would purchase the securities and
constituted an attempt to effect a purchase or sale. On the other hand, if Colip's principal
function at the meeting was to either temper the exuberance of the principal promoters (a
frequent reason why lawyers are asked to accompany "road shows" promoting new securities'
offerings) or to discuss the technical aspects of the partnership agreement or its tax
consequences with counsel for prospective investors (much as would occur in the negotiations
in any reasonably sophisticated business transaction), we think these facts are not susceptible
to the inference that an attempt to effect the purchase or sale of a security occurred. We hold
that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Colip's aflirmative conduct or
failure to act when reasonably expected to do so at a meeting with prospective investors made
it more likely than not that the investors would purchase the securities and therefore

constituted an attempt to effect the purchase or sale of the securities.
Id. at 578-79.
132. See, e.g., Rendler v. Markos, 453 N.W.2d 202, 206-07 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting
"agent" under the Wisconsin Securities Act, which adopted the USA).
133. 868 F. Supp. at 844.
134. Id.; see also Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 368 (Md. App. 1993)
(construing "agent" within Maryland's version of § 410(b) of the USA, for attorneys (citing MD. CODE
ANN. CORPS. & Ass'NS § 11-101(b) (West 2003))) (the operative definition is identical to that of the
USA, § 401(a)):
[W]e hold that an attorney could conceivably be considered an agent if he or she "represents a
broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect the purchase or sale of securities."
In order to be considered an "agent," an attorney must act in a manner that goes beyond legal
representation. The definition of "agent" in § 11-101(b) does not include attorneys who
merely provide legal services, draft documents for use in the purchase or sale of securities, or
engage in their profession's traditional advisory functions. To rise to the level of "effecting"
the purchase or sale of securities, the attorney must actively assist in offering securities for
sale, solicit offers to buy, or actually perform the sale.
Id. The court reviewed cases construing "agent" in other jurisdictions and found the following:
Although the definition of "agent" in the state securities laws discussed above may vary to
differing degrees from the definition in § 11-101(b), they each have one thing in common:
they do not impose liability upon an attorney who merely provides legal services or prepares
documents for his or her client. To impose liability, the attorney must do something more than
act as legal counsel.
Id.
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"agent," RUSA replaces the term "agent" with "sales representative." 135

RUSA's definition of "sales representative" is identical to the USA's definition
of "agent."' 36 The 2002 Act reverts to the use of the term "agent"'137 rather than
"sales representative."' 138 Nonetheless, the 2002 Act contains a provision which
may encompass outside attorneys. The 2002 Act subjects not only employees
to secondary liability exposure but also individuals who are "associated with a
person liable."' 39 It can be argued that the language "an individual who is an
employee of or associated with a person liable"' 140 covers employees as well as
independent contractors. Interestingly, neither the comments nor the definitions
of the 2002 Act provide interpretative guidance with respect to this subject.
Therefore, attorney liability under this provision remains possible.
b. What Can Be Material Aid?
Reference may be made to the former "substantial factor" test' 41 under
142
Securities Act section 12. In Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Securities Co.,
the
Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Alabama Supreme Court regarding
Alabama's blue sky law, including a question regarding the standard for
"material aid" in a provision "based almost verbatim on § 410(b) of the

135. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 610(d) (1985).
136. § 101(14).
137. "Agent" is defined in section 102(2) of the 2002 Act similarly to its definition in the USA,
except that the 2002 Act no longer provides exclusions in the definition as did the USA. The 2002 Act
adds eight exemptions from registration for "agents" while the USA has none. The term "agent" is
defined in the 2002 Act as follows:
"Agent" means an individual, other than a broker-dealer, who represents a broker-dealer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities or represents an issuer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of the issuer's securities. But a partner,
officer, or director of a broker-dealer or issuer, or an individual having a similar status or
performing similar functions is an agent only if the individual otherwise comes within the
term. The term does not include an individual excluded by rule adopted or order issued under
this [Act].
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 102(2) (2002); see Official Comment to the definition of Agent, § 102(2),
which states: "An individual whose acts are solely clerical or ministerial would not be an agent under
Section 102(2). Cf Section 402(b)(8). Ministerial or clerical acts might include preparing written
communications or responding to inquiries." § 102(2), official cmt.
138. See supra note 82; UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509(g)(4) (2002):
(4) a person that is a broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser
representative that materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liability under subsections (b)
through (f), unless the person sustains the burden of proof that the person did not know and, in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of conduct by reason
of which liability is alleged to exist.
139. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 509(g)(3) (2002):
(3) an individual who is an employee of or associated with a person liable under subsections
(b) through (f) and who materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liability, unless the
individual sustains the burden of proof that the individual did not know and, in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of conduct by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist.
140. Id.
141. See discussion supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
142. 482 So. 2d 1201, 1207 (Ala. 1986).
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Uniform Securities Act."'143 The Alabama Supreme Court held that "material

aid" is a lower standard than the former "substantial factor" test under
Securities Act section 12.'44
Although state courts generally find federal court interpretations to be
reliable guides when construing similarly worded statutes, 145 the USA specifies
146
who should be held liable and under what conditions liability should attach.
Since the federal acts do not define the term "materially aids," it does not
assistance"
necessarily follow that the federal courts' usage of the "substantial
147
or "substantial factor" test should be persuasive to state courts.

According to a number of state courts, an attorney's normal professional
services constitute "material aid."'

48

For example, under an Oregon statute

143. Id.
144. Id.at 1207-08:
Jesup & Lamont's argument to the effect that its activities must be a "substantial factor" in
the sale to Foster is misplaced. It is true that the Eleventh Circuit has held that one may be
liable under § 12 of the Securities Act as a seller if his activities are a substantial factor in the
sale. It is also true that the Eleventh Circuit here held as a matter of law that Jesup & Lamont's
activities were not a substantial factor in the sale to Foster. That, however, casts no light on
the question of whether Jesup & Lamont materially aided the sale within the meaning of the
Alabama Act.
Our response to the first question is affirmative. Under the facts of this case, a jury was
justified in finding that Jesup & Lamont materially aided the sale to Foster, and it is,
therefore, secondarily liable under § 8-6-19(b), ALA. CODE 1975 [(current version at ALA
CODE § 8-16-19(c) (Ala. Code 1975))].
See also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101, 122 (Conn. 1997) (interpreting "material aid"
within the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act, to have "a natural tendency to influence, or [being]
capable of influencing the decision of the purchaser") (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. to 1993) § 36498(c) (Rev. to 1995), current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36b-29(c)). For another case interpreting
the term "materially aid," see Kirchoffv. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 653 n.7 (Ind. 1998):
The standard for "materially aids" under state securities laws has been found by some courts
to be different from federal aider and abettor liability. Compare Monsen v. Consolidated
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978) (Federal aider and abettor liability
requires a showing of (1)existence of a securities law violation by the primary party; (2)
knowledge of that violation by the aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance by the
aider and abettor in the achievement of that violation. Substantial assistance is determined by:
(a) the amount of assistance given by the person; (b) the person's presence or absence at the
time of the violation; (c) the person's relation to the person committing the violation; and (d)
the person's state of mind.), and Saltzman v. Zem, 407 F. Supp. 49, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(applying three prong test for federal aider and abettor liability), with Conn. Nat'l Bank v.
Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101, 121-122 (Conn. 1997) (Violation of "materially aids" provision
requires showing of (1) violation of securities act and (2) material assistance by aider and
abettor. Material assistance is aid that has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of
influencing the decision of the purchaser.), Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Minn.
1988) (adopting three-prong federal test for aider and abettor liability but defining substantial
assistance in prong three as a substantial causal connection between the culpable conduct of
the alleged aider and abettor and the harm to the plaintiff), and Mendelsohn v. Capital
Underwriters Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (applying substantial causal
connection standard to state aider and abettor violation).
145. See supra note 62.
146. See supra note 48; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581 § 33 cmts. (Vernon 2005).
147. See cases cited supra note 65.
148. See generally cases cited supra note 122 (inferring attorney's normal professional services
constitute material aid); infra note 151.
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where "every person who participates or materially aids in the sale"' 149 may be
secondarily liable, counsel's normal services constitute material aid.' 50 Federal
case law provides further support in the construction
of aiding and abetting
151
liability under section 10(b) prior to Central Bank.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Prince v. Brydon distinguished
"participates" from "materially aids," asserting they "are separate concepts, not
synonyms.1 52A person may participate without materially aiding or materially
aid without participating.' ' 153 Essentially, "material aid" encompasses aid that
may not "effect" the sale but that makes the sale possible. 154 The court in
Prince implied that "aids" has the broadest scope practicable and the limitation
on a potential aider's liability is whether the assistance is "material:" 155
"Typing, reproducing, and delivering sales documents may all be essential to a
sale, but they could be performed by anyone; it is a drafter's knowledge,
judgment, and assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that are
'material' to the sale."' 56 In giving the term "aids" a broad scope and then
limiting it with the concept "material," the Prince court rejected the argument
that a lawyer is a mere "scrivener."'' 57 In this regard, Oregon law normally
deems attorneys providing their customary professional services within the
149. See OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2003); see supra note 116.
150. See generally infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
151. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126-28 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing jury
verdict that law firm aided and abetted § 10(b) violation), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 1104
(1989); Powell v. H.E.F. P'ship, 835 F. Supp. 762, 768 (D. Vt. 1993) (denying law firm's motion to
dismiss because firm provided "substantial assistance" in drafting materially misleading documents for
purposes of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act). The Powellcourt also held
that the law firm was also an "agent" within the secondary liability provisions of Vermont's Securities
Act and provided "aid" by drafting documents. Even if "material aid" is held to be "substantial
assistance," the court found the standard to be satisfied within aiding and abetting analysis under §
10(b). Id. at 765. See Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624-30 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying former aider
and abettor liability under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986). See generally
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD

AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 7:319-7:323 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the former "substantial assistance"
test in private actions under § 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5).
152. 764P.2dat1371.
153. Id.; see Long, supra note 27, at 462.
154. See Filippone, supra note 50, at 1353 (arguing that "material aid" is broader than the
substantial factor test for "sellers"); see also Long, supra note 27, at 461 (stating the substantial factor
test "focuses on the sales activities causing the sale" whereas, aiding "focuses upon activities which do
not directly lead to the sale, but make it possible").
155. Filippone, supra note 50, at 1354, relying on Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1371 (Or.
1988).
156. Prince,764P.2dat 1371.
157. See Gary M. Berne & Neil Bregenzer, Participants'Liability Under the Oregon Securities
Law After Prince v. Brydon, 68 OR. L. REV. 885, 895 (1989) (also providing an interesting discussion of
the etymology of"scrivener"); see also Prince v. Brydon, 748 P.2d 158, 161 (Or. Ct. App.) ("Because
defendant only rendered routine legal services tothe partnership, he is not liable under ORS 59.115(3)
for participating or materially aiding in Brydon's illegal sale to plaintiff."), rev'd en banc, 764 P.2d
1370 (Or. 1988). But see Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
defendant's law firm merely "paper[ed] the deal"). See generally Keith A. Rowley, They Toil Not,
Neither Do They Spin: Civil Liability Under the Oregon Securities Law, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 335
(2001).
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scope of the provision. 158
Interestingly, comparing a state statute, such as Oregon's, that has a broad
secondary liability provision to a state statute that employs a "substantial
contributive factor" test to broadly define "seller," the same actions by an
158. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371. Aid or participation may be determined by a factual inquiry; see
Luallin v. Koehler, 644 N.W.2d 591, 596 (N.D. 2002) ("What constitutes participation or aid in any
way in making a sale of securities is determined upon the facts of each case and not by a fixed rule of
law."); see also North Dakota Securities Act Civil Remedies, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (2005):
Every sale or contract for sale made in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, or of
any rule or order issued by the commissioner under any provisions of this chapter, shall be
voidable at the election of the purchaser. The person making such sale or contract for sale,
and every director, officer, or agent of or for such seller who shall have participated or aided
in any way in making such sale shall be jointly and severally liable to such purchaser ....
Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371 (Aid or participation may be determined by a factual inquiry); Luallin, 644
N.W.2d at 596 ("What constitutes participation or aid in any way in making a sale of securities is
determined upon the facts of each case and not by a fixed rule of law."); Hogg v. Jerry, 773 S.W.2d 84,
88 (Ark. 1989) (holding material aid is a question of fact); Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188, 192
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding defendant named as the purchase administrator of unregistered
securities provided "material aid" under Michigan Uniform Securities Act, M.C.L. § 451.810(b) (based
on USA § 410(b)); Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Or. 1971) (citations
omitted):
A person need not have actual knowledge of an illegal securities transaction in order to
become a "participant" in such sale. The fact that a defendant did not know, and could not
have known, of the illegal quality of a securities transaction, while relevant to the issue of his
liability, is not relevant to the issue of his participation. . . . Further, a person may be a
"participant" in an illegal securities transaction without having communicated with the
purchaser.
It is not disputed that defendant Barton of the Nossaman firm prepared the legal papers
necessary for Nova-Tech to complete the sale of its securities. Even if Barton did not know
and could not have known of Nova-Tech's failure to register the securities, he was a
participant in the sale because, without his assistance, the sale would not have been
accomplished.
The other Nossaman defendants argue that they did not have a hand in the preparation of
documents, but it is undisputed that the Nossaman firm authorized Nova-Tech to include its
name as corporate counsel on Nova-Tech's 1968 and 1969 annual reports. In line with the
Oregon court's broad construction of the Blue Sky Law in Adamson, I hold that the Nossaman
firm's designation on Nova-Tech's published reports as Nova-Tech's corporate counsel is
enough, for purposes of ORS 59.115(3) and 59.155, to make the firm's partners "participants"
in any unlawful securities transaction in which the annual reports were used for promotional
purposes.
Hirata Corp. v. J.B. Oxford & Co., 193 F.R.D. 589, 600 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss
claim against clearing brokerage under Indiana Securities Act, § 23-2-1-19, based on § 410(b) of the
USA):
Our research of interpretations of other jurisdictions' codifications of § 410 of the Uniform
Act leads us to two conclusions: First, those courts interpreting § 410 of the Uniform Act have
not applied liability for "materially aiding" to one who merely performed "ministerial
functions.") See, e.g., Robertson v. White, 635 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (interpreting
precursor to Arkansas Code § 23-42-10); Denson v. Bear, Steams Sec. Corp., 682 So. 2d 69,
71 (Ala. 1996) (interpreting Alabama Code § 8-6-19(b)); Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370,
1372 (Or. 1988) (interpreting Oregon Code § 59.115(3)). Second, the question of whether a
party has "materially aided" in a violation of the security code is a question of fact properly to
be considered once the parties have had an opportunity to adduce their evidence. See Denson,
682 So. 2d at 71; Hogg v. Jerry, 773 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ark. 1989); Titan Oil & Gas v. Shipley,
257 Ark. 278, 517 S.W.2d 210, 222 (Ark. 1974); Metal Tech. Corp. v. Metal Teckniques Co.,
703 P.2d 237, 245 (Or. App. 1985). These two principles do not define all the contours of
"material aid" under the Indiana statute, but they suffice to resolve the pending motion.
See also Black & Co., 333 F. Supp. at 472.
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attorney may not incur liability in both states. The "substantial contributive
factor" test rests largely on tort concepts of causation, while the "materiality"
of aid standard focuses more on the nature of the aid. 159 Hence, while routine
legal services may not be a "substantial contributive factor," they may
constitute "material aid" as "it is a drafter's knowledge, judgment, and
assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that are 'material' to the
1 60
sale."

This position is eminently sensible. Offering and related disclosure
documents normally are essential for inducing investor comfort and closing of
transactions. In this context, the attorney is not a mere scrivener. Rather, as a
gatekeeper to the consummation of deals, counsel plays an integral role in
effectuating adequate disclosure. 161
159. See supra note 154.
160. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371; see also Excalibur Oil v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 467 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Hogg, 773 S.W.2d at 88; Young v. Kwock, 474 P.2d 285, 287 (Haw. 1970). In Young, the
Hawaii Supreme Court stated:
[Corporate officer] argues that "aids" means inducing the purchaser to buy and that the facts
indicate that she took no part in the "selling" effort. Though some jurisdictions have followed
such reasoning, no such restricted interpretation on the liability section seems warranted. The
plaintiffs did not allege fraud in the inducement, but rather the sale of unregistered securities.
Therefore, not merely the salesmen who induced the purchase but all officers, directors and
agents who in any way contributed to the disposition of the securities are liable.
474 P.2d at 287. HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-20 (2003) provides:
Every sale made in violation of this chapter shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser;
and the person making the sale and every director, officer, or agent or for the seller, if the
director, officer, or agent has personally participated or aided in any way in making the sale,
shall be jointly and severally liable ....
Within the Chapter, HAW. REv. STAT. § 485-25(a)(1)-(3), is modeled on section 101 of the USA, which
in turn is modeled on rule lOb-5. Interestingly, the definition section of HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-1
(2003) does not include a definition of the term "agent."
In Hines v. Data Line Systems, Inc., 787 P.2d 8 (Wash. 1990), the investors appealed a summary
judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys which the court of appeals had upheld. The investors
brought the action against the attorney defendants under WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 for a violation
of WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010, a provision similar to SEC rule lOb-5. The civil liability provision,
section 21.20.430(1), provides primary liability for sellers, and section 21.20.430(3) provides secondary
liability for:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer [that is primarily liable],
every partner, officer, director or person who occupies a similar status or performs a similar
function of such seller or buyer, every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids
in the transaction, and every broker-dealer, salesperson, or person exempt [from registration]
who materially aids in the transaction ....
Id.; § 21.20.430(3).
The Washington State Supreme Court upheld the summary judgment in favor of the attorney
defendants on the basis that the attorney defendants' advice was insufficient "participation in the sales
transaction" to rise to the level of being a "substantial contributive factor" sufficient to hold them liable
as sellers. Hines, 787 P.2d at 19-21. The court further upheld the summary judgment in favor of the
attorney defendants with respect to secondary liability on the basis that no issue of material fact was
presented that the attorney defendants fit one of the categories necessary for secondary liability. Id.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that "the
lawyer's opinion can be [an] instrument for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar"); SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (noting importance of
attorney in advising client with respect to disclosures); In re Fields, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,407, at 83,174-83,175 n.20 (SEC 1973), affid without opinion, 495 F.2d 1075
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (observing that a securities lawyer "works in his office where he prepares
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3. Statutory Havens ForAttorneys
By statute, a few states have excluded attorneys who provide their normal
professional services from liability as aiders. The Arizona and Ohio statutes,
for example, encompass every person who "participated in" the subject
transaction 162 but contain language that excludes from liability attorneys who
render traditional legal services. 63 The Florida statute as construed constricts
the liability of secondary actors by requiring proof that such persons solicited
the transaction. 164 Doing so significantly alleviates secondary liability for
attorneys because secondary actors appear to be liable only under
circumstances that would cause them to be primarily liable as sellers under the
165
Pintertest.

prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the
financial community, and the investing public must take on faith").
162. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003(A) (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43(A)
(West 2003) (cited in Riedel v. Acutote of Colorado, 773 F. Supp. 1055, 1066 (S.D. Ohio), affd 947
F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1991)) (stating that "every person that has participated in or aided the seller in any
way in making such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to the purchaser").
163. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003(A) (West 2004) ("No person shall be deemed to have
participated in any sale or purchase solely by reason of having acted in the ordinary course of that
person's professional capacity in connection with that sale or purchase."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.431(A) (West 2005) (insulating attorneys, accountants and engineers "whose performance is
incidental to the practice of [such] person's profession" from being "deemed to have effected,
participated in, or aided the seller in any way in making a sale or contract of sale in violation of the
[Act]"); cf Standard Charted PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
accounting firm not liable under statute when it engaged in its normal functions). See generally Richard
G. Himelrick, Arizona Securities FraudLiability: Charting a Non-FederalPath, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 203
(2000). Note that an attorney can lose the statutory immunity by participating in the sales transaction.
See, e.g., Gerlach v. Wergowski, 584 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Perkowski v. Megas
Corp., 563 N.E. 2d 378, 379-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). See generally Thomas E. Geyer, Michael P.
Miglets, & Keith A. Rowley, Civil Liability and Remedies in Ohio Securities Transactions,70 U. CIN.
L. REV. 939 (2002).
164. Florida provides secondary liability for "[a]ny person.., selling a security in violation of §
517.301 and every other director, officer, partner, or agent of or for the seller, if the director, officer,
partner, or agent has personally participated or aided in making the sale." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.211(2)
(West 2004). Section 301 is nearly identical to rule lOb-5. However, the extent of this apparent
secondary liability is limited:
[T]his Court holds that a plaintiff may recover under § 517.211 from either (1) his seller, who
he is in privity with, as well as (2) any officer, director, partner or agent of such a seller who
has solicited the sale of the securities on his own behalf or on behalf of the seller.
In re Sahlen & Assocs, Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 372 (S.D. Fla. 1991). "[T]his Court
determines that conduct sufficient to constitute solicitation for purposes of § 517.211 liability is similar
to that deemed sufficient by the Supreme Court in Pinter v. Dahl, [486 U.S. 622 (1988)] to hold one
liable as 'seller' under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933." Id. at n.40. Therefore, an attorney "must
be shown to have provided more than standard legal services to [the primary violator] in order to
impose liability as an agent under § 517.211." Bailey v. Trenam, 938 F. Supp. 825, 828 (S.D. Fla.
1996); see Ruben v. Medalie, 294 So. 2d 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Hughes v. Bie, 183 So. 2d 281
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); see also State v. Williams, 390 S.E.2d 746 (N.C. App. 1990).
165. See cases cited supra note 164.
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ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER MORE "FLEXIBLE" STATE SECURITIES
STATUTES

As discussed above, several states have departed from the parameters of the
USA with respect to "aider" liability. Pursuant to these statutes, an attorney
may be held liable for materially participating in or aiding the primary
violation even if the attorney is not an agent, control person, director,
employee, officer, or partner of the subject primary violator. Hence, under
these statutes, secondary liability based on aider principles may arise regardless
of counsel's relationship with a primary violator.'66
The following discussion covers two such states, California and Texas. In
these states, attorney liability exposure departs from the USA, leaving for
exploration some significant issues.
A. Texas
Similar to the USA and the federal Securities Act, the Texas Securities Act
(TSA) imposes primary liability exposure upon sellers, who sell a security in
violation of the TSA's registration requirements or by means of a material
misrepresentation or half-truth. 167 The Act also provides for primary liability
exposure for purchasers who buy a security by means of a material
misstatement or half-truth. 168 The TSA contains secondary liability provisions
69
for control persons and for material aiders.1
1.

Attorney Liability as "Seller"

Since the 1977 enactment of the current TSA, the Texas Supreme Court
has not interpreted the term "seller." In a decision predating the current statute,
the Texas Supreme Court in Brown v. Cole interpreted the term "seller" to

166. See supra notes 40-41, 52-59, 116-17, 148-60 and accompanying text; infra notes 185-94,
210-13 and accompanying text. Other than California and Texas, examples include IOWA CODE ANN. §
502.503 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(b) (repealed 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1-509G(5)
(West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2004).
167. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A (Vernon 2005), with 15 U.S.C.A.
§12(a)(l) (2005), and UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a) (1956). See Bromberg, Civil Liability Under
Texas Securities Act §33 (1977) and Related Claims, 32 S.W.L.J. 867 (1978); Keith A. Rowley, The Sky
Is Still Blue in Texas: State Law Alternatives to FederalSecurities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 99
(1998); Marc I. Steinberg, The Texas Securities Act: A Plaintif'sPreferredRoute?, 58 TEX. B.J. 1096
(1995).
168. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33B (Vernon 2005).
169. Art. 581-33F(l)-(2) (F(1) for control person, and F(2) for material aiders). With respect to
Texas' enactment of securities legislation since 1913, see Bromberg, Article in Tribute: Texas Business
Organizationand Commercial Law-Two Centuries of Development, 55 SMU L. Rev. 83, 99 (2001).
The statute was enacted "because 'numerous corporations ... are selling ... stocks throughout this
State, many of which are worthless, and . . . the people of this State are being imposed upon by
unscrupulous persons selling such worthless stocks .... ' (quoting 1912 Tex. Gen. Laws 66, 71). Or, as
stated by Professor Bromberg: "The greedy or crooked sold to the greedy or gullible." Id.
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' 70
include persons who served as "any link in the chain of the selling process."'
It is open to debate whether this expansive definition, which by its terms may
encompass attorneys rendering traditional services, retains validity under the

TSA.

In one restrictive decision a Texas appellate court held that the seller
provision in the TSA requires privity. 171 On the other hand, a number of Texas
appellate courts have indicated a continued acceptance of the Brown v. Cole

"link in the chain" test.' 72 Still, the "link in the chain" standard may be no
broader than the "substantial contributive73factor" test since its scope may be
limited by notions of "but for" causation.'
For example, in Lutheran Brotherhoodv. Kidder Peabody & Co., the court
seller.' 74
applied Brown v. Cole and held that the subject underwriter was a
However, the court ruled on the basis of the underwriter's role in the

preparation of the private placement memorandum and its active solicitation
and placement of the securities. 175 Joachim v. Magids is the only reported

Texas appellate case applying the "link in the chain" test to an attorney
draftsman. 176 The court's decision may be read to exclude an attorney
providing customary professional services from being a "link in the chain," and
thereby avoiding seller status because of the application of causation
principles.' 77 However, the court also may have based its decision on the
170. 291 S.W.2d 704, 708 (Tex. 1956).
171. Frank v. Bear, Steams & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App. 2000).
172. See Texas Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 775 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) ("The Act
applies if the seller is any link in the chain of the selling process.") (citing Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State,
539 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976)); Lutheran Bhd. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 829 S.W.2d 300,
306 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), set aside on other grounds, 840 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1992) (declining to limit
sellers to "those who pass title," citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1989)). Instead, "[a]rticle 58133A(2) applies if the defendant was any link in the chain of the selling process."). See also Pitman v.
Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496, 531 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (applying the broad definition in TEX. REv. Ctv.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(E) (Vernon Supp. 1996), the court stated "[m]oreover, one who 'offers or sells' a
security is not limited to those who pass title") (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988)). For federal
court interpretation of the term "seller" under the TSA, see Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 551 (5th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted) (limiting "the TSA to those who are actively engaged
in the sale process and prevents it from reaching those who merely participate in preparing an
offering"); Millcreek Associates, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 664, 676 (W.D. Tex.
2002) (accepting the argument that "the Comments to the 1977 revisions to the Texas Securities Act
expressly note that Section 33(a)(2) is a 'privity' provision 'allowing a buyer to recover from his offeror
or seller..."' (citing the Comment 1997 Amendment to the comments to the Texas Securities Act and
Frank v. Bear,Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000))).
173. See Brown, 291 S.W.2d at 709 (Tex. 1956) ("It is clear that but for Brown's activities and
repeated efforts the respondents would not have participated in the transaction.").
174. 829 S.W.2d at 300.
175. Id. at 306-37 ("The Texas Act defines 'sell' as any act by which a sale is made, including a
solicitation to sell, an offer to sell, or an attempt to sell. Article 581-33(A)(2) applies to a person who
'offers or sells' a security. It is undisputed here that the defendant acted as AABC's agent in the
preparation of the PPM's and in the placement and offering of the bonds. In doing so, it dealt directly
with the plaintiffs and was a seller within the meaning of the Act.").
176. 737 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App. 1987).
177. Id. at 856. The court declined to hold the attomey-draftsman liable as a seller for participating
"in the transaction by performing 'an act by which the sale is made,' and that he was therefore a 'link in
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attorney defendant's satisfaction of the statutory defense for sellers-that the
seller did not know about the disclosure deficiency and could not have known
about it in the exercise of reasonable care. The court found no evidence or
allegation that the attorney-draftsman was aware of the oral agreement
containing the alleged misrepresentation.178 Furthermore, the court found that
the alleged oral agreement was contrary to the advice that the attorney would
have given to the seller; in fact, an integral aspect of the stock purchase
agreement that the attorney-defendant had drafted contradicted the alleged
misrepresentation.179
2.

Attorney Secondary Liability as Aider

Significantly the Texas Securities Act (TSA) provides for secondary
liability for control persons 80 and material aiders. 181 The TSA imposes
secondary liability upon control persons who cannot sustain the burden of the
"quasi due diligence" defense. 82 Liability pursuant to the TSA also is incurred
the chain of the selling process,' which made him responsible for his client's actions.... The evidence
conclusively shows that the appellee acted solely as an attorney-draftsman in the preparation of the
stock purchase documents." Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. The facts of the case are as follows: the purchaser bought the company in reliance on an
oral representation made by his selling brother, Mortimer, that conflicted with the terms of the stock
purchase agreement. As part of the sale, the selling brother orally agreed to the purchasing brother that
he would renew his personal guaranty on a line of credit for the business. This oral agreement was not
in the stock purchase agreement. After the sale of the company, the selling brother did not renew his
personal guaranty on the line of credit for the business. The purchasing brother brought a suit against
his selling brother and against the selling brother's attorney as also being a seller. Id. at 853-54.
179. Id. at 854:
Appellee testified that he had never been told that Mortimer's guaranty was to continue after
the sale of Mortimer's stock and that as Mortimer's counsel, appellee would have advised
Mortimer against such action. Appellee testified that an "integral part of the agreement" was
the understanding that Mortimer would not continue to guaranty the company's obligation at
Houston National Bank.
180. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(l) (Vernon 2005):
A person who directly or indirectly controls a seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable
under Section 33A, 33B, or 33C jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to
the same extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer, unless the controlling person sustains
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
For case law on control person liability under the TSA, see Barnes v. Southwest FinancialServs., 97
S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Hagerty Partners P'ship v. Livingston, 128 S.W.3d 416, 421
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004); Texas Capital Securities Management, Inc. v. Sandefer, 80 S.W.3d 260, 268
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
181. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005):
A person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless
disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable
under Section 33A, 33B, or 33C jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to
the same extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer.
182. Art. 581-33F(l); art. 581-33F cmt. (stating that "§ 33F is new and derives in part from
Uniform Securities Act § 410(b) and U.S. Securities Act § 15 U.S.C.A. § 77o... " Section 33F(l)
appears to be primarily derived from section 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act and section 15 of the
Securities Act. Section 33F(2) had no comparable statutory analogue in the federal securities acts and,
while based on section 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act, is broader in that it is not limited to
specified persons who materially aid."). See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410 (2002).
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by anyone who provides material aid with the requisite scienter-"intent to

deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law."'1 83 The
ensuing discussion focuses on this latter provision.
The TSA departs from the USA regarding the scope of persons who can be
held liable for providing material aid. 184 The differences include: first, the TSA
makes potentially liable anyone who provides material aid, as opposed to the

enumerated persons set forth in section 410(b) of the USA; and second, the
TSA requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant's scienter as opposed to the
USA which gives the defendant an affirmative defense of inability to know
about the violation through the exercise of reasonable care.1 85 The pertinent
Texas statute provides:
A person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with
reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller, buyer, or issuer of
a security is liable ... jointly and severally with the seller,
1 8 6 buyer, or issuer, and to
the same extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer.

Perhaps surprisingly, no Texas court decision has definitively settled

whether the rendering of an attorney's normal services, such as the drafting of
an offering document, constitutes "material aid." Due to the importance that
offering and other disclosure documents have on investor decision-making and
the closings of deals, attorneys who draft such documents should be deemed
"material aiders" to the consummation of purchase and sale transactions given

87
their gatekeeper role.1
With respect to the requisite elements for aider liability that a plaintiff must

establish, a number of Texas courts1 88 have adopted the elements of former
aider and abettor private liability under Exchange Act section 10(b). 189 Under
this standard, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) that a primary violation of the securities laws occurred; (2) that the alleged aider
had "general awareness" of its role in this violation; (3) that the actor rendered
"substantial assistance" in this violation; and (4) that the alleged aider either a)
intended to deceive [the] plaintiff or b) acted with reckless disregard for the truth of

183. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005).

184. Id.; see cases cited supra note 172.
185. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005).
186. Id.
187. See sources cited supra note 161; Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41

SAN DIEGO L.

REV. 1387, 1389 (2004) (opining that "[1]awyers are gatekeepers and always have been").
188. See Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Frank v. Bear,
Steams & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)); Crescendo Invs., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d
465, 472 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Frank v. Bear, Steams, & Co., II S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000)); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 568 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
189. Frank v. Bear, Steams & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); cases cited supra
note 188; see also Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 532 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)
(noting that that liability for material aiding under the TSA would not necessarily be commensurate
with aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5: "The Texas Securities Act recognizes on
its face, however, that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirements for aider and abettor liability.
Section 33F(2) holds liable any person, jointly and severally with the buyer, seller, or issuer, who
Imaterially aids' with 'reckless disregard' a violation of Sections 33A, B, or C").
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In Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 19 1 the Texas Supreme Court examined
the requisite intent to hold one who materially aids liable under the Texas
Securities Act. The court held that the TSA's requirement of "reckless
disregard for the truth or law" signifies that an aider may be liable under that
provision "only if it rendered assistance to the [defendant purchaser or] seller
in the face of a perceived risk that its assistance would facilitate untruthful or
illegal activity by the primary violator."'1 92 Pursuant to this standard, the
plaintiff need not prove that the alleged aider knew of the precise
misrepresentation or omission made by the primary violator.193 Rather, the
aider's subjective awareness of such a primary violator's improper activity is
deemed sufficient to establish the requisite intent for the imposition of
1 94
liability.'
B. California

California's securities laws' 95 define prohibited transactions' 96 and provide
for a three-tiered civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement system.197 The
illegality of the subject misconduct is generally set forth in section 25401.198
Separate sections contain private causes of action for the misconduct: section
199
25501 provides for primary liability for a seller in privity with the buyer,
190. Goldstein, 113 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Frank v. Bear, Steams & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2000)).
191. 168 S.W.3d 837, 840-43 (Tex. 2005), rev'g and remanding 119 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.
2003).
192. Id.at 837 (interpreting TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon 2005)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 845:
The investors acknowledge that [alleged aider] Sterling may not have known the exact
misrepresentations that [the primary violator] Comelius was making to the investors, but they
argue that Comelius was operating an illegal pyramid scheme. We agree that knowledge of
such an illegal scheme, if proven, could support a finding that Sterling acted 'with reckless
disregard for the truth or the law' even if Sterling could not have known of the particular
misrepresentation made by Cornelius.
195. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25000 (West 2005) (Corporate Securities Law of 1968).
196. Id.
197. See People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1285-86 (Cal. 1995); MARSH & VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER
THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS § 14.02(1) (2d ed. 2003).

198. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2005):
It is unlawful for any purpose for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy or
offer to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral communication which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.
199. Such liability also is imposed against a buyer in privity with the seller. Id:
Any person who violates Section 25401 shall be liable to the person who purchases a security
from him or sells a security to him, who may sue either for rescission or for damages (if the
plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be, no longer owns the security), unless the
defendant proves that the plaintiff knew the facts concerning the untruth or omission or that
the defendant exercised reasonable care and did not know (or if he had exercised reasonable
care would not have known) of the untruth or omission. Upon rescission, a purchaser may
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section 25504 imposes secondary liability upon certain persons, 20 0 section
25504.1 provides for secondary liability for persons who materially assist with
the intent to deceive, 201 and section 25504.2 focuses on liability for
professionals in certain situations involving expertised statements contained in
20 2
offering materials.
1. Attorney PrimaryLiability as Seller
Section 25401 makes the use of a material misrepresentation or half-truth
in the purchase or sale of a security illegal, and section 25501 provides primary
203
civil liability for a breach of section 25401.
Section 25501 also provides two
statutory defenses: that the purchaser knew about the misstatement or halftruth, and that the defendant could not have ascertained the disclosure
deficiency through the exercise of reasonable care. 204 The provision thus far
has been construed to require strict privity between the buyer and seller.20 5
recover the consideration paid for the security, plus interest at the legal rate, less the amount
of any income received on the security, upon tender of the security. Upon rescission, a seller
may recover the security, upon tender of the consideration paid for the security plus interest at
the legal rate, less the amount of any income received by the defendant on the security.
Damages recoverable under this section by a purchaser shall be an amount equal to the
difference between (a) the price at which the security was bought plus interest at the legal rate
from the date of purchase and (b) the value of the security at the time it was disposed of by
the plaintiff plus the amount of any income received on the security by the plaintiff. Damages
recoverable under this section by a seller shall be an amount equal to the difference between
(1) the value of the security at the time of the filing of the complaint plus the amount of any
income received by the defendant on the security and (2) the price at which the security was
sold plus interest at the legal rate from the date of sale. Any tender specified in this section
may be made at any time before entry ofjudgment.
200. Id.:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under Section 25501 or
25503, every partner in a firm so liable, every principal executive officer or director of a
corporation so liable, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions,
every employee of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or transaction constituting
the violation, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the act or transaction
constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
such person, unless the other person who is so liable had no knowledge of or reasonable
grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to
exist.
201. Id.:
Any person who materially assists in any violation of Section 25110, 25120, 25130, 25133, or
25401, or a condition of qualification under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 25110) of
Part 2 of this division imposed pursuant to Section 25141, or a condition of qualification
under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 25120) of Part 2 of this division imposed
pursuant to Section 25141, or an order suspending trading issued pursuant to Section 25219,
with intent to deceive or defraud, is jointly and severally liable with any other person liable
under this chapter for such violation.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 427 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("Section 25401
prohibits the offer or sale of a security by means of any oral or written communication which contains a
materially false or misleading statement. Section 25501 creates the cause of action for a violation of §
25401.").
204. See supranote 195.
205. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting that portion of
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If a strict privity approach is applied for determining who is primarily
liable as a seller, the scope of persons potentially liable as sellers under
California law is narrower than that under the Pinter test. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Pintercrafted a test that includes some non-privity participants within
the definition of seller, such as those who solicit the transaction for the
vendor's benefit or for their own pecuniary gain. Pursuant to a strict privity
regimen, such persons are excluded from primary liability as sellers in
California. Under Pinter, attorneys performing their customary professional
services are not section 12 sellers. 206 Additionally, since the California test
seems to be even more restrictive than the Pinter test, it is unlikely that
attorneys7 providing their traditional professional services will be deemed
20
sellers.
2. Attorney Secondary Liability as MaterialAider
In addition to control person 2 0 8 and agent (and other status) liability
exposure, 09 California has broadened the scope of liability through legislative
Cal Corp. Code § 25501 which reads: "Any person who violates Section 25401 shall be liable to the
person who purchases a security from him or sells a security to him..." Id. The court concluded that
the statute limits sellers to being the "actual seller" or, put another way by the court, "the literal
seller."); accord In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., No. CV 87-3574-RSWL, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8083
(C.D. Cal. May 19, 1989); In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 447, 458-59 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
206. 486 U.S. at 655 (1988), discussed supra note 2 and accompanying text.
207. See Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d at 1296 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissing claim against attorney
under § 25504.1 as it "was not in force at the time of the sale"; dismissing claim against attorney under
section 25501 as the attorney was not the "actual seller"); see also People v. Yanez, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d
867, 876 (Cal. App. 1994) ("[O]f course, an attorney who participates in an illegal offering... in a role
as offeror or seller, certainly should not be shielded from ... liability.").
208. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504 (West 2005); see supra note 200; In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19784, at *43 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1994):
Section 25504 imposes liability on those who "control" primary violators of Section 25401
(liability for those who offer to sell securities using untrue statement or omission of fact).
Like Section 25401 itself, liability under Section 25504 requires a showing of strict privity
between the buyer/plaintiff and the controlled seller.
See also MARSH & VOLK, supranote 197, at § 14.03(4)(c).
209. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504; id. § 25003(a) ("'Agent' means any individual, other than a
broker-dealer or a partner of a licensed broker-dealer, who represents a broker-dealer or who for
compensation represents an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities in
this state.") (emphasis added) (the emphasized portions are not in the definition of "agent" within §
40 1(b) of the USA); Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 844 (S.D. Cal. 1985):
Mr. Cheyne (an attorney) does not fall within the umbra of § 25504. That section's standard
of care extends to partners, officers, directors, employees, broker-dealers, or agents of an
entity issuing nonexempt unqualified securities. As CSCC's attorney, Mr. Cheyne does not fit
within the plain meaning of the listed categories.
See also In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., No. CV 87-3574 RSWL, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *72
(C.D. Cal. July 23, 1990) (allowing claim under CAL. CORP. CODE § 1507) (quoting I Witkin
CaliforniaProcedure§ 53, at 73 (3d ed. 1985) ("[An attorney] will usually be the agent of his client in
transactions in which he acts for him."). In dismissing the claim against the accountants under this same
provision for failure to allege the accountants "represented the corporation in transactions with other
parties" the court quoted CAL CIV. CODE § 2295 definition of agent, "one who represents another,
called the principal, in dealings with third persons," and said: "There does not appear to be a general
presumption of agency for accountants as there is with attorneys probably because an attorney is more
likely to represent a client in 'dealings with third persons."' In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 1990 U.S. Dist.
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action in sections 25504.1 and 25504.2. Section 25504.1, provides: "Any
person who materially assists in any violation of Section ...25401 . . . with

intent to deceive or defraud, is jointly and severally liable with any other
person liable under this chapter for such violation. ' ' 21 Under this provision, an
attorney may be held secondarily liable if she intentionally, or perhaps
recklessly, "materially assists" a person who violates section 25401.211 As thus
far interpreted, the section requires more than a showing of recklessness. 212
Hence, as compared to other state statutes with similar provisions, a plaintiff

has a more onerous task in proving liability under the California statute.21 3
3. Attorney PrimaryLiability as Expert

Liability exposure under section 25504.2 arises when a professional
provides an opinion in a prospectus or offering circular used in the offer or sale
of a security and that professional consents to be and has been named in such
an offering document as having prepared or certified any part of the document,
any written report, or any valuation used in connection therewith.214 As part of

the plaintiffs prima facie case, both materiality and reliance must be proven. 215
LEXIS 11867, at *75.
210. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25501.1 (West 2005). Section 25504, which sets forth secondary liability
upon certain persons, is contained in supra note 200. Note that an attorney who serves as in-house
counsel generally is deemed an employee and, hence, may be subject to liability under section 25504.
See supranotes 114-115 and accompanying text.
211. See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19784, at *43 ("Section 25504.1
imposes liability on those who aid and abet a primary Section 25401 violation (liability for those who
offer to sell using untrue statements or omissions of fact)."); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11867, at *52 (denying motion by law firm to dismiss claim under CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1
to the extent the claims were for actions "undertaken with 'the intent to deceive or defraud."').
212. See Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1987) (allegations of recklessness not
sufficient under § 25504.1); Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1453 (S.D. Cal. 1988)
(dismissing claim under § 25504.1 against attorneys for failure to plead "material assistance with intent
to deceive or defraud"; maintaining the § 25504.2 claim against the attorneys because the plaintiff
"alleged facts showing that [the attorneys] provided an offering document upon which the investors
relied"); Bitter v. Borton, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8, at *4, *22 (Cal. App. Apr. 15, 2002)
(dismissing claim under § 25504.1 against law firm for issuing a materially misleading opinion letter in
an alleged "Ponzi Scheme" for failure to allege the opinion letter was issued "with the intent to deceive
or defraud plaintiffs").
213. See Pulvers,614 F. Supp. at 844:
Liability for the qualification violation, however, does not extend to Mr. Cheyne. Aider and
abettor liability under § 25504.1 requires material assistance of the violation "with intent to
deceive or defraud." Plaintiffs failed to prove requisite scienter as to Mr. Cheyne. Similarly,
Mr. Cheyne does not fall within the umbra of § 25504. That section's standard of care extends
to partners, officers, directors, employees, broker-dealers, or agents of an entity issuing
nonexempt unqualified securities. As CSCC's attorney, Mr. Cheyne does not fit within the
plain meaning of the listed categories.
For state statutes that have a less stringent standard, see supra notes 52-59, 116-17, 148-60, 166, 185-94
and accompanying text.
214. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2, quoted supranote 202; see MARSH & VOLK, supra note 197, at
§ 14.03(4A).
215. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2(a)(2) (West 2005); see In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11867 (granting motion to dismiss against accountants for failure to allege reliance); Lubin
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (citing In re Rexplore, Inc.
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Like Securities Act section 11, 2 16 section 25504.2 provides the subject
2 17
professional with a "reasonable investigation" (or due diligence) defense.
Generally, the scope of liability under section 25504.2 extends only to
situations where the California qualification rules require the subject
professional's consent. 21 8 The effect is that experts in offerings that are not
subject to the California qualification rules normally have no liability exposure
under section 25504.2.219 Significantly, the statute extends liability only to

expertised portions of the prospectus or offering circular. Thus, under
California securities law, an attorney who drafts the prospectus or offering
circular normally would face potential liability
under section 25504.2 only for
220
the attorney's attributed expertised portions.
Regulations adopted by the California Commissioner of Corporations
explicitly encompass attorneys as experts. The regulations, in fact, contain
specific requirements for attorney experts. 222 For example, the rules mandate
Sec. Litig., 685 F. Supp. 1132, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2004); see In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.
1994); Weinberger v. Jackson, No. C-89-2301-CAL, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18394 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11,
1990); Escort v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); SEC Rule 176, 17 C.F.R. §
230.176 (2004).
217. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2(b)(1) (West 2005). Another defense available is that what was
used in the prospectus or offering statement "did not fairly represent such person's statement as an
expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from such person's report or valuation as an expert." Id.at
25504.2(b)(2). See supra note 202.
218. The Commissioner's regulations define "written consent" as that required by section
260.504.2.2. That section requires consent when the qualification rules so provide. CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
10, §§ 260.504.2.1(d), 260.504.2.2(a) (2004); MARSH & VOLK, supra note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(a); see
also Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. at 846:
In addition to imposing a standard of care ... the statute limits potential exposure to the
expert who "pursuant to rule of the commissioner [of Corporations] has given written consent
to be and has been named in any prospectus." Cal. Corp. Code, subsection 25504.2(a). The
Commissioner's Rules require that such written consent be filed for any prospectus containing
expertised material where the underlying offering is subject to qualification ....
With Mr. Cheyne's [the subject attorney's ] consent, his written opinion to the 21-31
limited partnership interests' exempt status accompanied the private placement memorandum,
and his name appeared in the offering prospectus, again, with his consent. No "written
consent" was filed with the Commissioner of Corporations, however, precisely because Mr.
Cheyne advised that the offering should issue without qualification in an alleged exempt
private placement. The Commissioner's Rules only require the filing of written consent for
use of expertised material where the offering is subject to qualification ....
Mr. Cheyne contends that because no written consent was filed, and because § 25504.2
limits exposure to instances where written consent is filed "pursuant to rule of the
commissioner," he is not liable under that section. His reasoning, however, advances a
conclusion which the statute's drafters did not likely intend. If it were followed, an attorney
would never be liable under § 25504.2 where he negligently determined that a written consent
need not be filed because he wrongly advised that an offering is exempt. This would preclude
attorney liability where the public is most in need of protection.
219. See Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. at 846-47; MARSH & VOLK, supra note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(a);
supra note 218.
220. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2(c) (West 1977); MARSH & VOLK, supra note 197, at §
14.03(4A)(a).
221. CAL. CODE REGS.tit. 10, § 260.504.2.1 (2004).
222. Id.§ 260.504.2.2(c)(2); see Marsh & Volk, supra note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(b)(iv).

Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws
the naming and filing of consent from a subject attorney "[w]hen a prospectus
or offering circular contains an opinion of counsel as to the legality of the
issue," 223 or when information is stated to be on "authority from an
224
225
attorney,"2 24 including title opinions. The rules do not require the filing of a
written consent on the basis of an attorney being named as representing "the
underwriters or selling security holders. 22 6
Section 25504.2 evidently is a primary liability provision under which a
professional's potential liability is not derivative of another's actions but such
professional's own material disclosure inadequacies. Both section 25401 (the
general prohibition against material misstatements and half-truths) and section
25504.2 prohibit the use of material misstatements and half-truths in a
prospectus or offering circular. The liability provided by section 25504.2,
however, is limited to expertised materials and provides its own defenses and
standard of liability different than the other liability provisions.2 27
V.

CONCLUSION

Attorneys face significant liability exposure under the state securities laws.
Attorneys can be held primarily liable when they are "sellers" of securities, or
under some state statutes, like California, when they are experts. Depending on
223. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 260.504.2.2(c)(2)(A) (2004).
224. Id. § 260.504.2.2(c)(2)(B).
225. Id. § 260.504.2.2(c)(2)(E).
226. Id. § 260.504.2.2(c)(2)(C). In its entirety, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 260.504.2.2(c)(2) provides:
(2) Attorneys.
(A) When a prospectus or offering circular contains an opinion of counsel as to the
legality of the issue, the written consent of the attorney furnishing the opinion must be
filed. If any other attorney is also named as having prepared an opinion as to the legality
of the issue, the written consent of such other attorney must also be filed, even though
the opinion of such attorney is not included in the prospectus or offering circular.
(B) If any information contained in the prospectus, other than referred to above, is stated
to be furnished upon the authority of an attorney, such attorney shall be named in the
prospectus or offering circular and such attorney's written consent to being so named
shall be filed. Where the same attorney is named with respect to several parts of the
prospectus, it is not necessary to file a separate written consent with respect to each such
part but the consent filed must be broad enough to cover all matters with respect to
which the attorney is named as having acted.
(C) When an attorney is named in a prospectus or offering circular as having acted for
the underwriters or selling security holders, no consent will be required by reason of such
attorney being named as having acted in such capacity.
(D) When the opinion of one attorney relies upon the opinion of another attorney, the
written consent of the attorney who prepared the initial opinion must be filed if such
attorney is named in the prospectus or offering circular.
(E) When information, such as the nature of title to properties, is stated in a prospectus or
offering circular to be based on an opinion of counsel, the name of the attorney must be
disclosed in the prospectus or offering circular and such attorney's written consent must
also be filed. The name of such attorney need not be set forth at the particular place
where the information based on his or her opinion is given, provided such attorney is
otherwise identified and named elsewhere in the prospectus or offering circular.
227. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 197, at § 14.03(4A)(a); supra note 217 and accompanying
text.
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the applicable jurisdiction and counsel's status relative to the subject client,
secondary liability may be incurred. In a number of states, counsel has liability
exposure based on materially aiding the primary violator with the requisite
intent. In view of the increasing number of actions being instituted against
corporate and securities attorneys, future decisions by state courts hopefully
will clarify many of the murky issues that await resolution.

